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CONTRACT THEORIES AND THE RISE OF
NEOFORMALISM
John E. Murray, Jr.*
I. CHALLENGES TO NEOCLASSICAL THEORY
The promise of multidisciplinary influences in legal academic
literature over the last three decades signaled the recognition of
important theoretical dimensions that could inform legal doctrine.'
The product of the new theorists, however, was often seen as a diverse
assortment of intellectual frolics by academic lawyers that largely
ignored legal doctrine or denigrated it as a collection of indeterminate
norms.2 Beyond its potentially negative effects on legal education and
* Chancellor and Professor of Law, Duquesne University. Former President,
Duquesne University and former Dean of the University of Pittsburgh and Villanova
University Schools of Law. While it is important to emphasize that Professor Joseph
Perillo is not responsible for any of the views contained in this article, I am pleased to
recognize his enormous contribution in a lifetime of contracts scholarship to law
students, the bench, the bar, to me and to other scholars. His vast writings display
meticulous research and invaluable insights deserving a major place in the history of
contracts scholarship. He writes without guile and with a total commitment to the
enhancement of justice as a distinguished member of the academic bar.
1. These are times of ferment in legal academia. Standard doctrinal analysis,
which all but occupied the field a decade ago, is now retreating before the
onslaught of all sorts of fancy new techniques. Strange-sounding jargon
imported from other disciplines-the Frankfurt School of sociology,
existentialism and phenomenology, neoclassical economics and capital-
markets theory-is appearing in the law journals. New ideas are
spreading across the empire of doctrinal analysis.
Geoffrey P. Miller, A Rhetoric of Law, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 247, 247 (1985) (reviewing
James Boyd White, When Words Lose Their Meaning: Constitutions and
Reconstitutions of Language, Character and Community (1984)).
2. The best known critique of the new "impractical" legal scholarship is the
article by Judge Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal
Education and the Legal Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34 (1992). A rejoinder by
Professor Levinson recognized the
well-documented disinclination of an increasing number of legal academics
to write about the American legal system from the "internal" perspective of
the judge or practitioner and an inclination instead to write for an audience
consisting primarily of other scholars whose lives are lived "outside" the
actual practice of law as conventionally defined. The reasons for this
development are multiple and complex, ranging from the contingencies of
political elections and the "capture" of the judiciary, in the last decade
especially, by a political party with which most legal academics do not
identify, to much vaster cultural issues surrounding the concept of
"modernity" and "modernization."
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the profession,3 much of it is neither comprehensible nor relevant to
the concerns of judges and practitioners.' More recent academic
literature advocates a return to formalism, a so-called neoformalism5
The judicial temptation to succumb to a new era of formalism and its
exclusive values of certainty and predictability may be magnified
when courts are convinced that much of the product of academic
lawyers is no longer useful in the extension and refinement of
doctrine.
Corbinized contracts scholars who have been immersed in the
realism of Karl Llewellyn are often characterized as "neoclassical"
guardians of dominant contract doctrine. Critics describe
neoclassical contract law as "the law of the Uniform Commercial
Code, [and] the Restatement (Second) of Contracts .... It is
'neoclassical' because it addresses the shortcomings of classical
[contract] law rather than offering a wholly different conception of the
law."7  Critical Legal Studies ("CLS") scholars assert that because
Sanford Levinson, Judge Edwards' Indictment of "Impractical" Scholars: The Need for
a Bill of Particulars, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 2010, 2010-11 (1993); see also Robert W.
Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars, and the "Middle Ground," 91 Mich. L. Rev. 2075, 2111
(1993) ("Some of the new wave of scholarship does indeed seem horribly pretentious
and vacuous-schlock economics, schlock history, schlock philosophy, schlock
poststructuralist theory-with little promise of helping anybody to understand the
legal world or work in it or transform it. Almost all the articles are far too long.").
Notwithstanding this criticism, the Author otherwise defends the value of theoretical
scholarship.
3. See Graham C. Lilly, Law Schools Without Lawyers? Winds of Change in
Legal Education, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1421 (1995).
4. Recognizing that no judge could benefit from certain "wild literature" in the
law journals, Judge Richard Posner wondered why legal scholarship must always
serve only the legal profession. While "much of their vast scholarly output is trivial,
ephemeral, and soon forgotten," that is the nature of scholarship, which is a "high-
risk, low-return activity" analogous to salmon breeding where only two of 6000
salmon eggs may produce two adult salmon. Richard A. Posner, The
Deprofessionalization of Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1921, 1928
(1993). In a tribute to the work of leading Critical Legal Studies scholar Professor
Mark Tushnet, the authors conclude, "Many, if not most, law professors are
completely invested in the internal practice of law and nothing Mark says should have
much relevance for them." Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Legal Historicism
and Humanity: The Work of the Law Professor in the Wake of Bush v. Gore, 90 Geo.
L.J. 173,174 (2001).
5. William J. Woodward, Jr., Neoformalism in a Real World of Forms, 2001 Wis.
L. Rev. 971.
6. Labels such as "neoclassical" may be rejected by such scholars. Karl
Llewellyn was called a "realist" and those who subscribe to his contract law, as
illustrated in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") may insist on this
characterization. Still others may prefer "modern" contract law, as manifested by the
U.C.C. and the Restatement (Second), of Contracts. In this article, "neoclassical"
refers to those scholars who share a Corbin/Llewellyn/U.C.C./Restatement (Second),
perspective. This Article recognizes, however, that neoclassical contract law is a
continuously evolving, anti-formalistic set of norms and guides that must be
constantly scrutinized and criticized in pursuit of a more realistic, precise and fair
recognition of the actual or presumed intention of the parties to the contract.
7. Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev.
[Vol. 71
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every rule and standard of neoclassical contract law can be
deconstructed, they are hopelessly indeterminate.8 Relational and
empirical contracts scholars, however, view neoclassical rules as
excessively determinate and its flexible standards as woefully
inadequate to address the complexity of attitudes and behavior that
inhere in every contractual relationship.9 Scholars advocating the
economic analysis of law believe that neoclassical theory is not
sufficiently oriented to the values of wealth maximization and
efficiency which promise rationality, certainty and predictability in
contracts adjudication.10  Neoformalists contend that flexible
standards of neoclassical doctrine create an illusion of "immanent
law" whose very existence is questionable.1 To avoid dangerous
judicial speculation, unlike the "wholly different conceptions" of
contract law, neoformalists urge courts to enforce the facially
unambiguous terms of a contract "as written."' 2  The neoclassical
tradition has not wholly embraced these different conceptions.
With the exception of an extremely limited appreciation of basic
economic theory, the contracts case law does not reflect the new
theories. Nor are they reflected in any relevant statute. It is
important to consider whether neoclassical theory or one or more of
the new conceptions can better serve the social institution of contract
in the twenty-first century.
II. THE "WHOLLY DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS" OF CONTRACT LAW
A. The "Death of Contract"
Though it did not provide the substantive basis for new contract
theories, Grant Gilmore's startling 1974 monograph, "The Death of
Contract,"'3 was a catalyst for a movement away from doctrinal
contracts scholarship to theoretical concepts that are highly critical of
current doctrine. Gilmore described a dramatic alteration of contract
doctrine in a new era of "contort." 4  Promissory estoppel would
overwhelm the monistic bargained-for-exchange requirement of
consideration that was alleged to be nothing more than a belated
737, 738 (2000).
8. See infra Part II. B.
9. See infra Part II.C, E.
10. See infra Part II.F.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 847, 851 (2000) (citing Eric Posner, A Theory of Contract Under Conditions of
Radical Judicial Error, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 749 (2000)).
13. Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract (1974).
14. For commentary on the "contort" concept, see Jay Feinman & Marc Feldman,
Pedagogy and Politics, 73 Geo. L.J. 875 (1985); see also Peter Linzer, Law's Unity-
An Essay for the Master Contortionist, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 183 (1995).
2002]
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analysis manufactured by O.W. Holmes. 5 The book was widely
promulgated and cited hundreds of times in law reviews.
Notwithstanding the generally accepted view that its thesis is
historically and analytically unsound,16 it is often welcomed as
provocative, whimsical and entertaining. The few judicial references
to Gilmore's book are attenuated at best, such as a casual phrase in a
United States Supreme Court opinion warning that contract law must
not be allowed to "drown in a sea of tort" 7-a repudiation of
"contort." Beyond the thesis' flawed history, it became abundantly
clear, even to Gilmore," that the reported "death of contract" was at
least premature since the thesis appeared while contract law was
undergoing a period of historic vitality in the recorded case law. 9 As
one court aptly suggested two decades after the book appeared, "'We
are told that Contract, like God, is dead.' In this computer age case,
15. See Gilmore, supra note 13, at 17-23.
16. See, e.g., Richard Speidel, An Essay on the Reported Death and Continued
Vitality of Contract, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 1161 (1975). See also the insightful analysis by
Professor Perillo describing the serious flaws of Gilmore and others concerning the
origins of the objective theory. Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory
of Contract Formation and Interpretation, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 427 (2000).
17. Nathaniel Shipping, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 920 F.2d 1256, 1263 (5th Cir. 1991)
(quoting East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866
(1986)).
18. In 1981, Professor Gilmore reflected on a conference concerning the teaching
of contract law: "So I think we should provide ourselves with an explanation of why
this field of law, which somebody or other said was dead, some time ago, is not only
alive and well but bursting at the seams." Charles D. Kelso, The 1981 AALS
Conference on Teaching Contracts: A Summary and Appraisal, 32 J. Legal Educ. 616,
640 (1982). His ensuing "explanation," however, clings to the "contort" notion.
"[T]he rebirth of contracts is an accomplished fact. It makes no difference that it has
been reborn as 'contort."' Id. at 642.
19. Marc Galanter, Contract in Court; or Almost Everything You May or May Not
Want to Know About Contract Litigation, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. 577, 583 [hereinafter
Galanter, Contract Litigation].
[T]here was a great surge of contract litigation after 1960 that for several
decades outpaced the increase in tort. Diversity contract filings in the federal
district courts rose steadily from less than five thousand cases in 1960 to over
thirty-two thousand cases in 1988. From 1982 to 1990, often regarded as the
very core years of the litigation explosion, diversity contracts filings actually
outnumbered tort filings.
Id. at 583. It is clear that "There are more contract cases today than a century ago-
and there are far more per capita than there were during the twentieth century
[between 1930 to 1960]." Id. at 623. In 1992, contracts cases filed in state courts of the
nation's seventy-five largest counties numbered 365,263. Over forty-nine percent of
these cases resulted in an agreed settlement. Carol J. DeFrances & Steven K. Smith,
U.S. Dep't of Justice Statistics Special Report, Civil Justice Survey of State Courts
1992, Contract Cases in Large Counties 8 (1996). The table is reproduced by
Galanter. Galanter, Contract Litigation, at 625. In his book, Gilmore christened
Professor Stewart Macaulay as the "Lord High Executioner" of the "Contract is
Dead" movement based upon his pursuit of the empirical description of contract
discussed infra Part II.E. In 1985, Macaulay suggested that Gilmore's title ("Death of
Contract") is misleading since "Contracts as a living institution is very much with us."
Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 465,465.
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we learn that Contract, at least, is very much alive and well in the
Ninth Circuit. 20
B. Critical Legal Studies
The most provocative legal theory of the twentieth century was the
revolutionary effort with the benign title, "Critical Legal Studies. '21
Though it describes all legal reasoning as myth, its principal target is
contract law because the social institutions of contract and property
constitute the mechanism of the market system.22 CLS is expressly
Marxist and nihilistic,23 which necessitates the harshest criticism of
capitalism and its operative mechanisms.24 CLS language is filled with
20. Apollo Group, Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 58 F.3d 477, 478 (9th Cir. 1995). After the
sentence, "We are told that Contract law, like God, is dead," the next sentence of the
Gilmore book reads, "And so it is." Gilmore, supra note 13, at 1.
21. See Roberto Mangaberra Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (1986)
(Professor Unger is the philosophical architect of the movement); Mark Tushnet,
Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction to its Origins and Underpinnings, 36 J. Legal
Educ. 505 (1986); Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 Yale
L.J. 1515 (1991) [hereinafter Tushnet, Political History].
22. See John E. Murray, Jr., Murray on Contracts 13 (2001) [hereinafter Murray,
Contracts].
Private property determines who is to possess and control the resources of
society. Contract determines how persons and resources are brought
together in the productive and allocation processes. Property and contract
together constitute the mechanism of competition. Profit and utility
maximization compel firms and consumers to produce and to buy. Freedom
of trade ensures that industry and markets will be open to those who seek to
maximize their profits and utilities.
Id.
23. This thesis asserts that all efforts to provide a principled account of judicial
behavior (or anything else, for that matter) are vulnerable to the
techniques of deconstruction, or "trashing" as it has affectionately come to
be know [sic] among its practitioners. A corollary of this thesis is that all
judicial efforts at principled decision-making are necessarily doomed to
failure. It is the nihilist implications of the indeterminancy thesis that has
caused the critical legal studies movement to be such a controversial one.
Girardeau A. Spann, A Critical Legal Studies Perspective on Contract Law and
Practice, 1988 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 223, 225. "I am not overlooking the fact that critical
legal studies is frequently associated with contemporary versions of Marxism.
Although this association has undoubtedly contributed to the controversy
surrounding the movement, I suspect that it is the nihilist proclivities of certain
adherents that has generated most of the alarmist opposition." Id. at 225 n.5; see also
Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 Yale
L.J. 1 (1984). For a critique of the Singer analysis, see John Stick, Can Nihilism Be
Pragmatic, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 332 (1986).
24. See Singer, supra note 23, at 23 ("The entire structure of wage labor on which
capitalism is based ... violates the Constitution unless the government compensates
workers for corporate profits paid to shareholders."). A well-known CLS theorist,
Professor Duncan Kennedy, emphasized crit bias by suggesting that capitalism might
be considered a form of duress in creating pressures which may not be different from
the violence of pointing a gun at the other bargaining party. Kelso, supra note 18, at
627. In The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 Ohio St. L.J. 411, 424 (1981), a
leading CLS scholar, Mark Tushnet, suggested that if he had been appointed to the
federal bench, he would most "likely advance the cause of socialism."
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notions of economic slavery in a society of power structures
maintained and enhanced by culturally determined rules of contract
law. Any suggestion of rational norms is denounced as the unwitting
promulgation of pervasive political influence." CLS is designed to
prove that any rule, principle or standard of contract law as well as
other doctrinal norms can be deconstructed (read "destroyed").26
Since every theory, including CLS theory, can be deconstructed, even
25. Critical legal studies scholars claimed that "law is politics," and by that
they meant not merely that politics has an important influence on law,
say, through judicial appointments, but rather that the development of
the law is continuous with, if not reducible to, the exercises of political
will and power. They argued that all normative structures, especially
those of the law, are riddled with a "fundamental contradiction," a
conflict between the longing for intimacy and the distrust of others. As a
result of this conflict, all normative structures point in two directions and
are thus radically indeterminate with respect to the duties or conclusions
they impose. There are no right answers in law, nor could there ever be.
Rather, law is simply politics in formal garb.
Owen M. Fiss, What Is Feminism?, 26 Ariz. St. L.J. 413,424 (1994).
26. Clear examples of CLS deconstruction are difficult to discover in the
otherwise obtuse CLS literature. Professor Spann provides illustrations of the
deconstruction of contract theory beginning with the mutual assent foundation to the
concept of agreement. Spann, supra note 23, at 233-50. The requirement of mutual
assent is said to rest on an opposition between agreement and non-agreement.
Agreement is favored over non-agreement because the object of contract is to enforce
consensual transactions: "Accordingly, a contractual obligation is enforceable only to
the extent that it results from a meeting of the minds." Id. at 233. As authority for
this statement, the author cites the treatise of Allan Farnsworth, failing to note that
Professor Farnsworth is and always has been a prominent critic of the misleading
phrase, "meeting of the minds"-a view shared by other neoclassicists. Having
posited the emasculated premise of the "will theory" of contract law, the illustration
proceeds: "If a court were to enforce an apparent contract that did not genuinely
embody a meeting of the minds, it would be aligning itself with the coercive,
disfavored member of the hierarchy [or non-agreement]." Id. at 234. Since contract
disputes reflect the parties' disagreement over the effect to be accorded the terms of
their agreement, "there is no mutual assent-no contract-with respect to that
contingency. As a result, enforcement of the putative agreement constitutes coercive
judicial interference with the autonomy of the promisor in derogation of the
consensual nature of contractual obligation." Id. The inevitable conclusion is that the
original hierarchy-agreement over non-agreement-is inverted and the principle of
mutual assent has been deconstructed. The mutual assent principle "not only fails to
account for the manner in which courts determine whether a contract exists, but it
also fails to have any coherent content." Id. It is, therefore, a clear illustration of the
"indeterminancy thesis" of CLS, i.e., "all principled accounts of perceived phenomena
are demonstrably inadequate." Id. at 230. A footnote to the deconstruction of the
mutual assent principle admits the possibility "that the parties really did reach
agreement with respect to the troublesome contingency and that one of the parties is
simply pretending that no agreement was reached." Id. at 234 n.23. This possibility,
however, does not resurrect contract theory for CLS advocates because such
"pretending" is said to convert the case into "a tort case, involving fraud on the part
of one of the parties, with which classical contract law has no reason to concern
itself." Id. This illustration is followed by deconstructions of the concepts of intent,
volition, expectation and consideration, all based on ancient views which bear only
the faintest resemblance to modern contract law. See also Edgar A. Hahn, Essay: A
Primer on Deconstruction's "Rhapsody of Word-Plays," 71 N.C. L. Rev. 201 (1992).
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the principle of contradiction must be ignored, except when it is used
to support the theory.27 CLS scholarship is predicated on an eclectic
and ersatz philosophy expressed in obtuse language punctuated by
startling allegations designed to shock, punish and destroy.2 A typical
CLS law review article allocates enormous space to a barely
penetrable introduction that redefines ordinary terms as a prelude to
what is billed as a radical thesis. 29 The resulting product is obscure,
often irrelevant and counterproductive to the refinement and
enhancement of legal doctrine which it eschews. Having allegedly
demolished extant structures, the CLS scholar is more than reluctant
to present an alternative design that will rise from the ashes on the
footing that CLS expertise is limited to demolition. Attempts to fill
that enormous gap produce an ambiguous "communitarian" notion of
a vague utopia."
While CLS has been mentioned thousands of times in law journals,
it is virtually ignored in the case law.3" The work of its luminaries is
27. See Fiss, supra note 25, at 424 (concerning the CLS principle of "fundamental
contradiction"). The author, however, discovers a subsequent rejection of that view
by prominent CLS scholars. See Duncan Kennedy & Peter Gabel, Roll Over
Beethoven, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 15-18 (1984); see also Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and
Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. Legal Educ. 518, 560-62
(1986).
28. See William Ewald, Unger's Philosophy: A Critical Legal Study, 97 Yale L.J.
665 (1988) (questioning the level of Roberto Unger's understanding of the schools of
philosophy to which his work refers).
29. See Ronald K. L. Collins, Outlaw Jurisprudence?, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 215, 215
(1997) (reviewing Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida
(John D. Caputo ed., 1997)).
30. See the description of Duncan Kennedy's "utopia" in Kelso, supra note 18, at
628-29. Professor Robert Nozick, then chair of the Department of Philosophy at
Harvard University, suggested,
It would be better, however, if critique did not involve the systematic
violation of the principle that you do not reject a theory until a better theory
is available. Indeed, since every theory will have defects, it is not enough to
reject a theory on the basis of discerned flaws and inadequacies, especially if
all one has to suggest in its place is something vague and ill-defined. (For
instance, "communitarianism;" see, for example, Roberto Unger, Knowledge
and Politics, Free Press, New York, 1975.)
Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations 631 n.* (1981).
31. Judge Judith Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals commented on the
paper of Professor Spann, supra note 23, as follows:
What I search for-in vain-in this paper is some proof of its
pronouncements. Professor Spann declares that "the critical legal studies
movement has demonstrated that the prevailing model of our decision-
making process is inadequate," and he further declares that the critical legal
studies movement offers something better. I seriously doubt both, and I find
no proof of either. There is no consideration of cases in this paper. There is
no reference to the experience of a practicing Crit lawyer or Crit judge, if
indeed there could be such a creature. There's no empirical data of any sort.
There's something disturbingly conclusory about all of this. Sweeping
declarations that "all judicial efforts at principled decision-making are
doomed to failure," that "there can be no principled explanation for
decisions," that "all legal decisions are. .. incapable of satisfactory
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also ignored, though its obtuse presentation may be wryly
dispatched.32 It is anything but remarkable that CLS theory suffered a
sudden death.33 What is remarkable is the number of law review
editors it managed to seduce and the generation of law students held
captive by its advocates who maintained a condescending tone toward
their non-CLS colleagues.34 A warning from Dean Paul Carrington
unwittingly infused longevity into the "movement" when he not only
questioned its premises but urged its advocates to have the integrity to
resign.35 CLS scholars suspected that such "alarmist opposition" was
generated primarily because of their nihilist rather than Marxist
views.36 After all, why should anyone be concerned that a CLS
professor dedicated his teaching to debunking any claim of certainty
and rationality in the law?37 Carrington's suggestion prolonged the
justification," that "law is really nothing at all," and that the law is a "mere
conglomeration of destructible doctrines that necessarily have no effect on
the way that legal decisions are made"-just to pick a few random quotes
from this paper-are provocative, they indeed have a certain ring. They just
don't ring true.
Judith S. Kaye, Comments on Professor Spann's Paper: Commentary by Judith S.
Kaye, 1988 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 266-67.
32. In Charlton v. Charlton, 413 S.E.2d 911 (W. Va. 1991) (Neely, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), after quoting the feminist legal philosopher Catharine
MacKinnon, the justice compares her writings with those of the philosophical leader
of the Critical Legal Studies movement, Roberto Unger. "Ms. MacKinnon
undoubtedly has some very intelligent things to say, but when I read her, I have the
same overwhelming sense of deprivation that I experience reading Roberto Unger.
Indeed, it is a tragedy that fate has denied these great luminaries the opportunity to
write in their native languages." Id. at 919 n.3.
33. During the late 1970s, and for a good part of the 1980s, critical legal
studies played a leading role in the theoretical debates in American law
schools. Hundreds attended annual conferences. Faculty appointments
were made in some of the leading law schools, such as Harvard and
Stanford. Student interest was insatiable. Today, the situation is strikingly
different. Students have been diverted. There are no new faculty recruits.
The work of critical legal studies scholars is of virtually no interest in
American philosophical circles. Many of its central tenets, including the
fundamental contradiction and the indeterminancy thesis, have been
renounced ... Critical legal studies is dead ....
Fiss, supra note 25, at 424.
34. "[T]hese critics or outsiders do not understand what [CLS] is." Tushnet,
Political History, supra note 21, at 1516. The author adds, "For example, if people
interested in law and economics spent one tenth of the time understanding critical
legal studies that [CLS] people spend understanding law and economics, we would all
be better off." Id. at 1519 n.17.
35. "[Tlhe nihilist who must profess that legal principle does not matter has an
ethical duty to depart the law school." Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J.
Legal Educ. 222, 227 (1984).
36. "My guess is that Dean Carrington, for example, would be relieved to learn
that members of the critical legal studies movement were merely Marxists." Spann,
supra note 23, at 225 n.5.
37. In a 1981 Conference on the teaching of contract law, Professor Duncan
Kennedy stated "that his role as a teacher was to debunk claims to certainty and
rationality in the law." Kelso, supra note 18, at 627. The technique of deconstruction
is used to accomplish this end. See supra note 23.
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agony by compelling those who would have otherwise ignored CLS to
leap to its defense on the footing that a professor has every academic
freedom to present not only disagreeable but silly views.3" Now that
the abject poverty of the theory is generally accepted, Carrington's
insight may appear more precocious than inappropriate.
C. Relational Contract Theory
The relational theory of contract law is attributed to the lifetime
scholarship of Professor Ian Macneil, who focused on the primal roots
of the concept of exchange and emphasized the relational character of
contracts. 39 Instead of the discrete or static transaction underlying
classical contract theory, Macneil recognized contract relationships
that extend far beyond the original offer and acceptance and insisted
that contract rights and duties should be determined within the overall
context of continuing relationships. While insisting that classical
contract law pretends that contractual obligations are conclusively
fixed and determined at a given moment of formation, Macneil finds
little solace in the neoclassical modifications of doctrine which, he
believes, continue the classical view with only an occasional and
woefully insufficient nod to the relational context. Advocates of
relational theory assert that the neoclassical school simply absorbs the
theory, pretending that it is neither revolutionary nor radical but
simply an extension of neoclassical truth.4" There is a very good
reason why neoclassicists do not regard relational theory as anything
more than a helpful insight supporting neoclassical theory. It is not a
new "school" or separate "theory" of contract law simply because
attention has been focused on the relational nature of contracts.4" It is
a valuable emphasis, but it is hardly a "wholly new concept." While
neoclassicists see relational concepts as desirable elaborations of
neoclassical theory, relationists see neoclassical theory as a subset of
an "overarching relational legal approach."42 Neoclassical recognition
of a theory as an important emphasis necessarily disappoints those
who passionately assert their discovery of truth and will not abide any
38. The earliest exchanges were not long in coming. See "Of Law and the River,"
and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. Legal Educ. 1 (1985).
39. See Ian R. Macneil, The New Social Contract (1980). Other articles by
Professor Macneil elaborating his thesis include Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term
Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, And Relational Contract Law, 72
Nw. U. L. Rev. 854 (1978); Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 Va. L.
Rev. 947 (1982); Values In Contract: Internal and External, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev. 340
(1983); Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentation, 60 Va. L. Rev. 589 (1974);
40. See Feinman, supra note 7, at 739.
41. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There Is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94
Nw. U. L. Rev. 805 (2000).
42. Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 877, 907 (2000).
2002]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
suggestion that it is not unitary truth.43
Relational theory wars against a contract law that no longer exists.
Even the chief architect of the relational movement admits an
insuperable challenge in discovering illustrations of purely "discrete"
transactions containing no relational elements, the quintessential
target of his thesis. To purify the spectrum of contracts ranging from
the purely discrete to the highly relational, it was necessary to
recognize that the purely discrete end of the spectrum does not exist.
It had to be replaced with a fiction-an "as-if-discrete" transaction.44
The theoretical illustration, however, requires dynamic modifications
of classical theory to be ignored. The elaboration of relational theory
required a target other than modern contract law. The target had to
be classical contract theory that was in a state of continuous erosion, a
veritable straw man, which Macneil and a handful of disciples
proceeded to pummel.45
D. Ignoring the Radical Nature of Neoclassical Theory
Critical legal scholars and, to a lesser extent, relationists, project a
world without the pervasive influence of Arthur Linton Corbin who
rejected monistic rules and provided a foundation for a modern and
realistic contracts jurisprudence. They trivialize the contribution of
43. See, e.g., Feinman, supra note 7, at 740 (criticizing the "limited" neoclassical
account of relational theory).
44. Macneil, supra note 42, at 895.
45. A cogent example appears in Paul J. Gudel, Relational Contract Theory and
the Concept of Exchange, 46 Buff. L. Rev. 763 (1998) [hereinafter Gudel, Concept of
Exchange] where the author presents two "quick" illustrations of the defects of
contract theory. The first is an 1881 case, Mo. Furnace Co. v. Cochran, 8 F. 463
(C.C.W.D. Pa. 1881). In Cochran, the buyer contracted for a year's supply of coal at
$1.20 per ton. Id. at 463. Shortly after the contract began, the market price rose to
$4.00 per ton which caused the seller to repudiate the contract. Id. at 464. The buyer
made a substitute purchase at $4.00 per ton and sought to recover the difference
between the contract price and the substitute ("cover") price. Id. The market price
then descended to $1.30 per ton and the court applied the difference between the
contract price ($1.20) and the market price ($1.30) at the time of delivery. Id. at 467.
After insisting that the deficiencies of the court's analysis would be vastly improved
through relational theory, the author states, "Today, happily, Missouri Furnace would
come out differently under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code .. " Gudel,
Concept of Exchange, at 767 (citing U.C.C. § 2-712, which permits a buyer to make a
reasonable "cover" purchase that would allow the buyer in such a situation to recover
the difference between the market and cover prices). In the second illustration, Air
Terminal Servs., Inc. v. United States, 330 F.2d 974 (Ct. Cl. 1964), the defendant
created a large number of metered parking spaces near the Washington National
airport terminal one year after entering a three-year contract with the plaintiff to
operate parking lots at the terminal. Id. at 976. The plaintiff claimed a breach of
contract which the court rejected on the grounds that the defendant had never
promised not to install parking meters and there was no warranty to this effect. Id. at
976-77. Gudel, however, admits, "This decision would probably come out differently
today. A court would likely find that in installing the meters, the United States had
violated the covenant of good faith that the law implies into every contract." Gudel,
Concept of Exchange, at 768 (citing U.C.C. § 1-203).
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Karl Llewellyn as little more than a modest tinkering with classical
theory. The genuine "wholly different conception" of contract law,
however, occurred a half century ago with the introduction of Article
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, created by Llewellyn, who had
been Corbinized by his teacher. Llewellyn not only intended but
effected radical changes in contract doctrine and became justifiably
furious when these changes were marginalized rather than recognized
as "deep, wide and vital."46  The new theories either reject this
characterization of Llewellyn's contribution or conclude that the
changes he ordained were not nearly deep and vital enough. They
necessarily reject the importance of the same or similar modifications
of classical doctrine in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. The
new theories are sometimes seen as descendants of the realists'
rejection of formalism, but their proponents deemphasize this heritage
because they aspire to being heralded as the creators of "wholly
different concepts."47  Relational theory may be seen as an
elaboration of realism. CLS, on the other hand, is a distortion of
realism. The ineluctable end of CLS theory is self-destruction and
despair.
46. Statement of Karl Llewellyn in I State of New York Law Revision
Commission Report: Hearings on the Uniform Commercial Code 49 (1954)
[hereinafter Hearings]. Llewellyn also made it clear that the Code would "remake"
sales law "vigorously and over the whole field, in order that the law may be made to
conform to commercial practice and may be read and make sense." Id.
47. In their continuous efforts to reduce neoclassical theory to irrelevancy, critics
sometimes resort to absurdities. Thus, "neoclassical contract law" is characterized as
"residual," since subjects such as labor law and corporate law "are no longer within
the scope of contract." Moreover, neoclassical contract law is also said to be
"fragmented" since "the law of sales" along with leases and, more recently, computer
information transactions are "marked off for separate treatment." See Feinman, supra
note 7, at 738-39. The notion that areas such as labor law or corporate law are not
within the "scope" of contract suggests no relation between these subjects and
contract law. It is theoretically possible to construct a course in contract law that
would include both corporate law and labor law as well as insurance law, antitrust law
and others. The first year of law school could then be devoted to one omnibus course
called "contracts." The fact that these courses are treated separately in law school
curricula does not suggest that they are outside the scope of contract law which is an
indispensable foundation for such courses. The charge that neoclassical contract law
is "fragmented" because Article 2 deals only with contracts for the sale of goods, the
more recent Article 2A deals with leases and the very recent Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act ("UCITA"-formerly found in draft form as Article
2B of the U.C.C.), is a colossal misrepresentation. The radically new contract law of
Article 2 forms the basis for neoclassical contract law as applied to all contracts
through its assimilation in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the pervasive
willingness of courts to apply Article 2 contract law by analogy to any contract. The
need for Article 2A was, and continues to be, dubious since, with some exceptions, it
applies the principles of Article 2 only with language changes to manifest leasing
terminology. Real "fragmentation" exists only in the even more dubious UCITA.
Though it claims an Article 2 heritage, it clearly departs from the neoclassical
tradition and augurs a dangerous retrogression to the formalism of classical contract
law which must be an even worse fate to the new theorists than a simple continuation
of the application of neoclassical contract law to computer information transactions.
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Llewellyn's new paradigms made so much sense that they have
been assimilated into the fabric of contract law with insufficient
appreciation of their radical nature. The entire agreement process was
affected. The obsession was a more precise and fair identification of
the agreement of the parties-their "bargain-in-fact"-as manifested
not only by their words, but by prior course of dealing, trade usage
and course of performance as well as other relational circumstances."
Formalistic and technical rules were rejected, repudiated and
scorned.49 Monistic theories of contract law were deconstructed, but
replaced with principles and guides that would allow courts to better
approximate the "true understanding" of the parties.5" The definition
of "contract" was stated in terms of the legal effect attributable to the
parties' "agreement," the quintessential focus of contract law,
unfettered by technical constraints.5 It was no longer necessary to
determine the precise moment of formation. 52  The failure of the
parties to express any number of terms would no longer be fatal if
they manifested an intention to be bound and there was an adequate
48. "'Agreement' means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their
language or by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or
usage or trade or course of performance as provided in this Act." U.C.C. § 1-201(3)
(2001).
49. Llewellyn's disgust with the use of the "title" concept provides an apt
illustration. The Comment to U.C.C. § 2-101 evidences this view. Emphasizing that
U.C.C. Article 2 is committed to determining legal consequences exclusively from the
contract of the parties "without resorting to the idea of when property or title
passed," the Comment concludes, "The purpose is to avoid making practical issues
between practical men turn upon the location of an intangible something, the passing
of which no man can prove by evidence and to substitute for such abstractions proof
of words and actions of a tangible character." U.C.C. § 2-101 cmt.
50. The U.C.C. "makes admissible evidence of course of dealing, usage of trade
and course of performance to explain or supplement the terms of any writing stating
the agreement of the parties in order that the true understanding of the parties as to
the agreement may be reached." U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 2 (emphasis added).
51. Among the numerous emphases placed on the "anti-technical" nature of
U.C.C. Article 2, see § 2-204(3) (though numerous terms are omitted, "a contract for
sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and
there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy"); § 2-206 cmt. I
("Former technical rules as to acceptance ... are rejected."); § 2-205 (no
consideration is necessary to make an offer by a merchant a firm offer if it is
evidenced by a writing and gives assurance that it will be held open to effect the
deliberate intention of a party to make an offer binding without technical constraints);
§ 2-209(1) cmt.l (no consideration is necessary to make a modification binding to
allow modifications "without regard to the technicalities which at present hamper
such adjustments"); § 2-306 (requirements and output contracts will be enforced
according to a standard of good faith and best efforts). Neither the archaic doctrine
of mutuality or obligation nor indefiniteness will preclude their enforceability. See
also § 1-102(1) (directing a liberal construction of the entire Code "to promote its
underlying purposes and policies"); § 1-106 cmt. 1 (directing a liberal administration
of the remedies provided in the Code "to negate the unduly narrow or technical
interpretation of some remedial provisions of prior legislation").
52. U.C.C. § 2-204(2) ("An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale
may be found even though the moment of its making is undetermined.").
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basis to afford a remedy in the event of breach.53 The radical new
principle recognized the inherent indefiniteness and relational
character of contracts: i
The rejection of formalism is pervasive in the new contract law.
The algebraic operation of the sacred "matching acceptance" rule was
eschewed,54 and numerous circumstances in the relation of the parties
became relevant to determine whether the terms of the original
manifestation of assent were unconscionable. 5  Classical theory
assumed that the typical offer required a particular manner of
acceptance. Article 2 and its progeny assume that the typical offeror
is indifferent as to the manner or medium of acceptance. 6 Classicists
were startled by the notion that accepting an offer by the shipment of
nonconforming goods constituted both an acceptance and
simultaneous breach, absent reasonable notice of an accommodation
shipment. 7  Classical contract law insisted that offers had to be
revocable, absent a separate option contract to make them
irrevocable.58 Neoclassical contract law recognizes that offers may be
made irrevocable through reliance or, under Llewellyn's insertion, by
an assurance that the offer will not be revoked. 9 Criticism of the
archaic pre-existing duty rule had its effect. Only those who insist that
reliance is everything will be displeased with the willingness of
modern courts to recognize reliance as a critical factor in pre-
contractual as well as post-formation circumstances.6" The
"agreement" in the new contract law is anything but static. Absent
any consideration or reliance, it may be modified by a subsequent
agreement including the powerful evidence of agreement called
"course of performance" which the new theories often ignore." Trade
53. Id. § 2-204(3) ("Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for
sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and
there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy."). This is the
genus section which is then supplemented by numerous sections, particularly §§ 2-304
through 2-316.
54. Id. § 2-207.
55. Id. § 2-302.
56. Id. § 2-206; see John E. Murray, Jr., A New Design for the Agreement Process,
53 Cornell L. Rev. 785 (1968).
57. U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b). "It is difficult to understand how the shipment of goods
can be both an acceptance and a breach. It will also be difficult to determine whether
or not a shipment of non-conforming goods was offered as an accommodation to the
buyer in substitution for the goods described in the order." Hearings, supra note 46, at
33 (statement of Karl Llewellyn).
58, Even classical contract law recognized the necessity to make an offer in a
"unilateral" contract irrevocable because of the offeree's part performance in reliance
on the offer. Restatement (First) of Contracts § 45 (1932).
59. U.C.C. § 2-205.
60. See Murray, Contracts, supra note 22, at § 66[C].
61. U.C.C. §§ 2-208(3), 2-209(1). Formalists do not ignore course of performance
or other unexpressed terms of the "agreement" such as trade usage and prior course
of dealing. They cast significant doubt on their verifiable existence and claim that
they allow incompetent courts to engage in irrational speculation of the "agreement"
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usage, course of dealing and course of performance are so important
that Article 2 insists that they are necessarily part of any contract and
impervious to parol evidence 'rule excision.62 Indeed, relational
"course of performance" will even overcome the express terms of the
contract 63-the rejection of the "static" contract straw man. The
notorious "plain meaning" rule of interpretation is emasculated' and
the parol evidence rule is relegated to a convincing manifestation that
parties "would certainly" not intend to be bound by alleged
agreements prior to their execution of a final and complete record.65
These and other clear illustrations of the pervasive antitechnical,
antiformalist and relational nature of the new contract law are not
given anything like their due among CLS scholars or relationists.66
They find Llewellyn's realism insufficiently realistic or relational and
lacking empirical verification.
E. Empirical Theories
Like relationists, advocates of the empirical ("Law and Society")
school lament the severe limitations of a comprehensive verification
of a contextual contractual relationship. The original work of Stewart
Macaulay emphasized the overriding importance of reputation and
other informal controls that questioned the significance of neoclassical
contract theory.67 Recent scholarship questions some of the basic
which they would limit to its express terms. See infra Part 111.
62. U.C.C. § 2-202(a).
63. While U.C.C. § 2-208 lists the hierarchy of trade usage, course of dealing and
course of performance from lowest to highest and insists that even course of
performance is subservient to the express terms of the contract, U.C.C. § 2-208(3)
imports § 2-209 to allow express terms to be waived or modified by course of
performance. Indeed, if course of performance as defined in U.C.C. § 2-208(1) is
discovered, it necessarily prevails over express terms.
64. Comment 1(b) to U.C.C. § 2-202 "definitely rejects ... [t]he premise that the
language used has the meaning attributable to such language by rules of construction
existing in the law rather than the meaning which arises out of the commercial context
in which it was used."
65. The "would certainly" test in U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 3 admits more evidence than
the traditional "natural omission" test created originally by Williston, and the classical
requirement that language must be facially ambiguous to allow a court to consider
prior or contemporaneous evidence is emphatically rejected. U.C.C. § 2-202, cmt.
1 (c); see Murray, Contracts, supra note 22, at § 84[C][6]. For an early recognition of
the liberalization of the parol evidence rule under the Code, see the opinion by
Justice Roger Traynor in Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968) ("The
draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial Code would exclude the evidence in still fewer
instances ... ").
66. For an exposition of modern contract law and its rejection of numerous
fundamental concepts of classical contract law, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, The
Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1743 (2000).
67. Stewart Macaulay et al., Contracts: Law in Action (2001) (cases and
materials); Stewart Macaulay, Long Term Continuing Relations: The American
Experience Regulating Dealerships and Franchises, in Franchising and the Law:
Theoretical and Comparative Approaches in Europe and the United States (Christian
Joerges ed., 1990); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business, 28 Am.
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assumptions concerning the existence of empirical data.68 The
unfulfilled empiricist aspiration is clear: only if every contracts dispute
can be subjected to comprehensive empirical and contextual
verification will the true contract of the parties, manifested by their
continuing relationships, be exposed. Academic lawyers who advocate
such empirical verification have much more time than courts to
pursue it, but they fail to produce anything resembling a functional
empirical structure as they bemoan the inability of courts to provide
ultimate contextual verification in every contracts dispute. A judicially
functional structure that the empiricists would find totally acceptable
is, therefore, impossible.69 The original empiricist view that informal
controls dominated the contracting process"' was later altered by the
discovery that "relational sanctions do not always produce
cooperation or happy situations. Trust can be misplaced."71  This
revelation induced the admission that "[c]ontract as a living institution
is very much with us."72 The yearning for complete verification,
however, continues.
Just as the relationists find it difficult to provide illustrations of the
static or discrete transaction, empiricists manifest insuperable
difficulty in describing how their theories could be applied in a
Soc. Rev. 555 (1963) [hereinafter Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations].
68. Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's Incorporation
Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 710 (1999) (questioning the reliance
on "usages of trade" and "commercial standards" upon which much of the early work
of empiricists was predicated). Professor Bernstein's work is analyzed infra Part IV.
Professor Macaulay recognizes the "admirable" empirical work of Professor
Bernstein but suggests that Bernstein "has not studied the entire commercial world"
and that there are empirically verifiable examples of business customs. His example
is the "two-by-four" board which does not measure two inches by four inches-an
example that has occurred to neoclassicists for the last fifty years. Stewart Macaulay,
Relational Contracts Floating On a Sea of Custom? Thoughts About the Ideas of Ian
Macneil and Lisa Bernstein, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 775, 787 (2000). Indeed, even the
classical case literature contains numerous additional and more sophisticated
illustrations. See, e.g., Hurst v. W.J. Lake & Co., 16 P.2d 627 (Or. 1932). The
neoclassical view of interpretation is illustrated by Mellon Bank v. Aetna Bus. Credit
Inc., 619 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1980).
69. Professor Macaulay, supra note 68, at 783 n.43, mentions Professor Arthur
Leff's view that law and economics is a desert and law and society is a swamp as
reported in Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes
147 (1991). See also Linda Ross Meyer, Is Practical Reason Mindless?, 86 Geo. L.J.
647, 652 (1998) ("Moreover, the empirical study of law is doomed to recreate the
difficulties of theory: it can never capture the practices, let alone serve to regulate
them, because it must redescribe and simplify them in order to make them the subject
of scientific investigation. Prediction would be impossible, because it would require
an account of all the factors involved in legal reasoning, and would fail for the same
reason descriptive theory fails."); Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories
of Law and Social Norms, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1603 (2000).
70. See Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations, supra note 67; see also Lawrence M.
Friedman, Contract Law in America: A Social and Economic Case Study 193 (1965)
(suggesting that contract law had become "the law of leftovers").
71. Macaulay, supra note 19, at 471.
72. Id. at 465.
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pragmatic litigation context. CLS scholars do not bother to try.
Relationists' efforts to suggest judicial utility are undiscoverable.
Empiricists unearth additional facts or- inferences in their "law-in-
action" pursuits, but their work has not been assimilated in the
workaday process of contracts adjudication.73 It appears exclusively in
their law review pieces that too often manifest mutual commiseration
and congratulations.
F. Law and Economics
Another dimension is provided by the law and economics
movement. 74  The fundamental concept of the exchange of
enforceable promises producing geometric wealth is the necessary
predicate of a market society. A collectivist state is anathema to
73. The value of the additional information provided by an empirical approach is
questionable at times. Thus, in a review extolling the virtues of an earlier (1995)
edition of the "Law in Action" casebook, supra note 67, the reviewer points to the
book's treatment of the well-known case, Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co.,
382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962), where the court limited recovery in a contract to repair the
land after strip mining to diminution in value, $300, rather than the cost of completion
of $29,000. Id. at 114. The empirical investigation revealed that members of the court
switched votes, the plaintiff's lawyer presented a weak case and two members of the
5-4 majority were accused of taking bribes in other cases and left the bench. There
was no evidence of bribes in the instant case. The reviewer concludes, "[W]hat sorts
of principles can we build on the backs of cases such as this?" William J. Woodward,
Jr., Clearing the Underbrush for Real-Life Contracting, 24 L. & Soc. Inquiry, 99, 107
(1999). Empiricists may find it difficult to believe that neoclassicists do raise questions
about the lack of proficient lawyering and the inequality of legal representation. It is
not remarkable that appellate judges sometimes switch their votes (often for valid
reasons) and some judges even violate their oaths (for invalid reasons). Absent this
"empirical" contribution, it has not been difficult for a typical neoclassical scholar to
conclude that the doctrinal analysis of the Peevyhouse court is outrageous,
particularly since the court does report the specific agreement of the parties requiring
remedial work that was not done and the fact that the plaintiffs lived on the premises.
This is not to suggest that the "law-in-action" pursuits associated with the University
of Wisconsin School of Law are unproductive. See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 19.
Indeed, they can provide important and unique dimensions in legal research and
scholarship as I discovered in my graduate work at Wisconsin under the guidance of
such luminaries as Willard Hurst and John Stedman. Sound empirical studies are
most productive when they are integrated with realistic efforts at law reform by
scholars who provide courts and legislatures with proposals that constitute workable
solutions.
74. The economic analysis of law ("EAL") movement is often traced to articles by
Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960) (economic
analysis of nuisance laws), and Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution
and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L.J. 499 (1961). For a comparison of the "Chicago
School" and other strands, see Nicholas Mercuro & Steven G. Medema, Economics
and the Law (1997). The dominant scholarly figure in this effort was Professor (later
Judge) Richard A. Posner whose book, Economic Analysis of Law, is currently in its
fifth edition (1998). Law and economics scholars are often accused of promoting a
return to a dangerous formalism by their concentration on "efficiency." See, e.g.,
Morton J. Horowitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 905
(1980); Richard A. Posner, A Reply to Some Recent Criticisms of the Efficiency
Theory of the Common Law, 9 Hofstra L. Rev. 775 (1981).
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economic theory for the empirically verified reason that it is
dysfunctional.75 To the extent that economic theory provides a
pragmatic justification for neoclassical theory, it is repugnant to the
views of contracts theorists who share collectivist views. While
recognizing the economic justification for a theory of contract law in a
society based on atomistic exchange regulated by the highly imperfect
invisible hand of the market, neoclassicists emphasize its significant
limitations.
Neoclassical recognition of "efficient breach" is heavily qualified by
the economists' treatment of transaction costs and the notion that
contract makers focus on efficiency, devoid of other motivations such
as a moral obligation to keep promises. 6 The assumption that parties
will weigh transaction costs rationally and leave their contracts more
or less complete depending upon such costs has an artificial flavor. 7
Similarly, the default rules that necessarily follow from this
explanation require courts to focus not on what the parties to the
centract "would have wanted," but what rational parties should have
wanted in light of transaction costs, i.e., an "untailored" or "off-the
rack" default rule, rather than the more "tailored" approach
suggested by the Code and Restatement (Second) of Contracts that
considers the particular circumstances of the parties."
Notwithstanding these reservations, economic theory is a dimension
of law, particularly contract law, that must be recognized in any
75. "[T]he impossibility of central planning or true socialism stems not from the
impossibility of centralized direction simpliciter, but from the impossibility of using
centralized direction writ large to handle the first-order problem of knowledge. It is
for this reason that centrally-planned economies have, without exception, failed
miserably to serve the public welfare." Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence:
Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 Va. L. Rev. 821, 837 (1992). "The attempt
by the Soviet Union to administer the economy without the social institution of
contract failed." Dietrich A. Loeber, Plan and Contract Performance in Soviet Law, in
Law in the Soviet Society 128-29 (Wayne R. LaFave ed., 1965); see also I E. Allan
Farnsworth & Viktor P. Mozolin, Contract Law in the USSR and the United States:
History and General Concept (1987).
76. This dimension is emphasized by Charles Fried, Contract as Promise (1981).
An argument for a qualified rational choice theory may be found in Scott, supra note
69.
77. Examples of transaction costs include the cost of negotiation, the cost of
discovering the likelihood of certain contingencies and drafting against them as well
as other legal fees. There is common sense in the view that the party who failed to
take cost-justified precautions should bear the risk of incompleteness as the "least-
cost-avoider," but this approach, alone, can be dangerously misleading even in terms
of pure economic analysis. It must be combined with the deterrence of opportunistic
behavior by a party who violates an identified norm arising from the contract or a
societal norm. A systematic combination of these two approaches in a pragmatic
fashion that courts could adopt has yet to occur. See George M. Cohen, The
Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law, 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 941 (1992).
78. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertnert, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87 (1989) (criticizing the
majoritarian, "untailored" approach and suggesting the possibility of "penalty-default
rules" for efficiency-minded courts and legislatures).
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modern exposition. Again, however, it is anything but a "wholly
different concept" of contract law.79 While it is an important
dimension, it is not unitary truth.
Ill. THE NEOCLASSICIST CONTRIBUTION-TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
CHALLENGES
As the new theorists pursued their Pickwickian tomes, neoclassicists
continued their efforts in the trenches to purify and enhance the social
institution of contract. The genuine CLS scholars of the twentieth
century were neoclassicists and they will continue that role in the
twenty-first. They are anything but simple narrators of the extant law
of contracts at any moment in time whose function is to preserve and
protect the existing hierarchy."' They are quick to attack faulty
judicial analyses, sometimes in strident tones. In the Corbin/Llewellyn
tradition, they view doctrine with pervasive suspicion. They recognize
existing rules as neither rigid nor fixed, but pliable and sometimes
entirely outmoded. Unlike other theorists, however, they suggest
productive changes in contract law ranging from modifications to new
doctrinal paradigms constituting workable solutions that courts can
understand and use. They are not mere compilers of cases, narrating
the conventional wisdom. They pursue the critical function of the
"academic bar," providing their "intellectual contribution of
suggesting the strand that holds-or should hold-all that has gone
before together and also suggest the next step that must be taken.""1
They are willing to work from within the extant framework of
practical legal reasoning and recognize that the unrealistic ideal is the
enemy of the good. They recognize the value of precedent and the
danger of sudden and repetitive changes in doctrine. They do not
covet recognition as the creators of "wholly different concepts" or
radical new theories. They write in their "native language" and reject
the notion that every utterance must begin with a redefinition of the
accepted meaning of terms. They recognize that their contributions
are among many that may enhance the reaction of the law to the
continually developing needs of society. They make no claim that
they have discovered unitary truth or total solutions to the societal
problem. Most important, however, they espouse hope rather than
the despair of the new theorists.
79. As Professor Joseph M. Perillo emphasizes in Misreading Oliver Wendell
Holmes on Efficient Breach and Tortious Interference, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1085, 1093
(2000), "efficient breach" hardly explains contract remedies.
80. For an assertion that the traditional legal scholar is nothing more than an
unpaid advisor or "clerk" to the judiciary, see Balkin & Levinson, supra note 4, at
177.
81. Kenneth F. Ripple (Judge, United States Court of Appeals, 7th Cir..), The




Neoclassicists recognize continuous challenges in the evolution of
contract law. They sniff formalism in every tainted judicial and
statutory breeze. While the tapestry of Llewellynesque leeways
woven on a Corbinized fabric signaled the continuous decline of
formalism, the actualization of that potential has always encountered
resistance. When the tension between the certainty required for
stable transactions and the desire to assure fair results in a
contextualized ambience proves frustrating for courts lacking
sufficient guidance from statutes or precedent, the courts may seek
assistance from the work of academic lawyers. If that source proves
incomprehensible or irrelevant, courts will ignore it and may find
satisfaction in a formalistic response. Scholars who have no interest in
serving the needs of the judiciary have no interest in serving the
pragmatic needs of society.
Karl Llewellyn was willing to apply his "metatheory" to societal
needs. In his effort to promote a more "decent" social institution of
contract, he felt compelled to empower courts to confront oppression
and unfair surprise. He understood that traditional categories such as
fraud and duress were insufficient, and he saw the folly of relying on
"covert tools." 2 While recognizing that "an approach by statute [is]
dubious, uncertain and likely to be both awkward in manner and
deficient and spotty in scope," 3 he created a confrontational device in
what he conceived "as perhaps the most valuable section in the entire
Code, 8 4 unconscionability, to insist that courts create workable
solutions.15  The conclusory nature and vague contours of that
provision did not deter him since he designed it exclusively as a device
that would empower courts to assure a more precise and fair
determination of the factual bargain by denying the imprimatur of
"assent" to oppressive terms or entire contracts. The
unconscionability provision was designed to allow for the elaboration
of "precedent" that would provide a detailed, sufficiently certain and
widely accepted analysis. 6 Further support would come from a
82. "Covert tools are never reliable tools." Karl Llewellyn, Book Review, 52
Harv. L. Rev. 700, 703 (1939) (reviewing 0. Prausnitz, The Standardization of
Commercial Contracts in English and Continental Law (1937)).
83. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 370
(1960).
84. Hearings, supra note 46, at 57 (statement of Karl Llewellyn).
85. U.C.C. § 2-302 (instructing courts to modify agreements, when appropriate, so
as to avoid unconscionability).
86. While the Llewellyn position pervades his other writings, his rationale for the
new unconscionability section of the U.C.C., § 2-302, is clearly evidenced by his
explanation to the New York Law Revision Commission on the afternoon of
February 15, 1954. Hearings, supra note 46, at 112-14. After some discussion of the
statute of frauds section, U.C.C. § 2-201, though the Commission had no more
cluestions, Llewellyn said, "May 1, before I sit down, say one other thing?" Id. at 112.
He did not await an answer before launching into an exegesis of the unconscionability
section. The evil to be avoided was the practice of business lawyers who "tend to
draft to the edge of the possible," insisting on "having all kinds of things that their
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species of that concept, a more focused "incipient unconscionability"
section that would require an extreme modification of one of the
sacred rubrics of classical contract law, the "mirror image" rule."
Another pervasive concept designed to war against the oppression of
algebraic rules would be provided through the overriding requirement
of "good faith" to complete the realization of a more precise and fair
approximation of the actual or presumed assent of the parties."8
Coupled with myriad sections denouncing specific artificial barriers of
classical doctrine that promoted formal analyses opposed to the
ultimate goal, these pervasive principles were designed to achieve the
clients don't want at all." Id. at 113. Unconscionability would prevent "drafting to the
absolute limit of what the law can conceivably bear. At that point, you run into what
they run into now, and what you run into now is, the court kicks it over." Id. at 113-14.
If the court will "kick it over" without any U.C.C. guidance, why did we need the
unconscionability section? Llewellyn answered that courts were refusing to enforce
clauses going beyond the limit of what they could bear through covert tools, i.e.,
courts would say that such clauses were not sufficiently clear. Id. at 114. Counsel
would then redraft the clause to meet a standard of excruciating clarity and the court
would still insist that the clause was not sufficiently clear. Llewellyn deplored such a
process that "does not make for good business, it does not make for good counseling,
and it does not make for certainty." Id. at 114. Rather, it leads "to precedent after
precedent in which the language is held not to mean what it says and indeed what its
plain purpose was, and that upsets everything for everybody in all future litigation."
Id. His solution was to "bring it out into the open" and say, '[w]hen it gets too stiff to
make sense, then the court may knock it out." Id. If courts openly confront these
material, risk-shifting clauses that clearly exceed reasonable business judgment, "you
are going to get a body of principles of construction instead of principles of
misconstruction, and the precedents are going to build up so that the language will be
relied upon and will be construed to mean what it says." Id. Thus, the principle of
unconscionability will be elaborated exclusively by courts in well-reasoned precedents
that will make drafting "to the edge of the possible" counterproductive if not
unethical. Id. at 113. To assure the development of this body of precedent, the
unconscionability section insists that "it is taken completely out of the realm of the
jury.... That is court action, and it is reviewable .... [I]t makes precedents and
guides." Id. at 114. Recognizing that judges are not familiar with the interstices of
business in specific trades, subsection (2) avoids leaving the question to the
"untutored imagination of courts" by allowing "all kinds of background to be
presented to instruct the court." Id. The design was intended to produce a section
"which greatly advances certainty in a now most baffling, most troubling, and almost
unreckonable situation." Id.
87. U.C.C. § 2-207. For an analysis of the relationship between the "battle of the
forms" section and the unconscionability section, see John E. Murray, Jr., Section 2-
207 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Another Word About Incipient
Unconscionability, 39 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 597 (1978). While it is common for courts to
view U.C.C. § 2-207 as "rejecting" the common law "mirror image" rule of contract
formation, that rule continues with respect to "dickered" terms such as the subject
matter and price. Thus, it is more precise to recognize U.C.C. § 2-207 as a major
modification of the "mirror image" rule.
88. Neoclassicists recognize the literal impossibility of the omniscient solution.
We accept the fact that we will never have a complete understanding of the subjective
intention of the parties or of all the contextual circumstances surrounding the
transaction. Simultaneously, however, we reject any notion that the evidence of the
contract should be relegated exclusively to words exchanged at some time in the past
which allegedly produce a "plain meaning" notwithstanding a host of other factors.
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Llewellyn vision of a contract law that would assure the highest
recognition of the factual bargain-the contextual "agreement." 9
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts dutifully absorbed the
unconscionability provision," flinched with respect to the "battle of
the forms,"'" and suggested a timid framework to avoid oppressive
standardized terms in the absence of a battle.92
The Llewellyn vision has not been fulfilled. The wavering and
blurred standards of unconscionability and good faith have yet to be
assimilated in a reliable analysis.93  Adumbrating numerous
"elements" to determine whether a term is unconscionable94 and
applying Arthur Leff's labels, "substantive" and "procedural," have
done little to rescue the concept from his devastating description of
the Llewellyn product as nothing more than an "emotionally satisfying
incantation" proving that "it is easy to say nothing with words."95
Attempts to overcome the oppression and unfair surprise that may
result from material, risk-shifting standardized terms secreted in a
maze of "boilerplate" through the doctrine of "reasonable
expectations" continue essentially to be limited to insurance contracts
where the doctrine originated.96 Its contours are deemed too vague
for general application. Just as formidable legal philosophers may
regard definitions of "justice" as superficial though insisting that
instances of manifest injustice are clearly recognizable, "good faith"
89. See John E. Murray, Jr., The Article 2 Prism: The Underlying Philosophy of
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 21 Washburn L.J. 1 (1981).
90. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 (1981). Courts recognize that this is
not an "attempt to define unconscionability in a black letter rule of law." Steinhardt v.
Rudolph, 422 So. 2d 884, 890 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
91. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 59 (1981); see John E. Murray, Jr., The
Standardized Agreement Phenomena in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67
Cornell L. Rev. 735, 745-61 (1982).
92. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211 (1981); see Murray, supra note 91, at
762-79.
93. See Carol B. Swanson, Unconscionable Quandry: UCC Article 2 and the
Unconscionability Doctrine, 31 N.M. L. Rev. 359 (2001) (tracing the judicial response
to the unconscionability doctrine and the efforts to revise U.C.C. § 2-302).
94. See, e.g., Mullan v. Quickie Aircraft Corp., 797 F.2d 845, 850 (10th Cir. 1986)
(listing seven elements); Wille v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 549 P.2d 903, 906-07
(Kan. 1976) (listing ten elements).
95. Arthur Leff, Unconscionability and the Code- The Emperor's New Clause,
115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485, 558-59 (1967). Professor Leff also discusses the suggested
"substantive"/ "procedural" dichotomy. Id. at 487. There is a considerable question
as to its utility though it may provide psychological comfort to courts. See Murray,
Contracts, supra note 22, at § 96[B][2][b].
96. The "reasonable expectations" concept is attributed to the work of Professor
Robert E. Keeton as originally suggested in Insurance Law Rights at Variance with
Policy Provisions, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 961 (1970). See also Robert E. Keeton, Basic Text
on Insurance Law 350-61 (1971). For a recent case listing jurisdictions adopting this
test in relation to insurance contracts, see Max True Plastering Co. v. United States
Fidelity and Guar. Co., 912 P.2d 861 (Okla. 1996). For an analysis of the use of this
principle in other cases especially by Arizona courts, see Murray, Contracts, supra
note 22, at § 97[B].
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may be understood principally through its absence. Its undeveloped
contours, however, create an excessively cautious judicial recognition
of bad faith practices. 7 Similarly, the chaos of the "battle of the
forms" not only continues unabated; it has been exacerbated. 8
It is an open secret that these substantial failures are not solely
attributable to deficiencies in the statutes or Restatement sections.
While the deficiencies of the "battle of the forms" section are well
known and the Restatement (Second) section on standardized
agreements was so timid that only an analysis of its comments and
related sections make any sense,99 Llewellyn's great hope for a
reasoned elaboration of the principle of unconscionability and the
explicit requirement of "good faith" remains unfulfilled.""' A decade
of attempts to redraft the "battle of the forms" structure into a
workable design and rescue it from the perils of notoriously technical
and counterproductive judicial construction proves conclusively that it
is much easier to criticize that product than to cure its original
deficiencies. Efforts to revise and clarify the concepts of
"unconscionability" and "good faith" have failed. They corroborate
Llewellyn's insistence that a statutory approach is dubious and
awkward. They have surrendered to the Llewellyn caveat that only
courts in a "common law tradition" can provide the necessary
elaboration as various revised drafts of Article 2 over the last decade
clearly attest-but herein lies the rub.
While Llewellyn was emphatically realistic about the appellate
judiciary, he underestimated the challenges he presented to judges
who do not possess the analytical abilities and vision of a Roger
Traynor or similar judicial luminaries."" When a concept cannot be
97. Combined with limitations on the duty of good faith [e.g., it does not
apply to pre-contractual negotiations] is spirited disagreement among
the commentators over what constitutes bad faith and a tendency in the
courts to resist a finding of bad faith even where the duty is imposed.
The result is that the potential of the duty of good faith for contracts,
not to mention relational contracts, has arguably not been realized in
the United States.
Richard E. Speidel, The Characteristics and Challenges of Relational Contracts, 94 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 823, 840-41 (2000) (citing Richard E. Speidel, The "Duty" of Good Faith in
Contract Performance and Enforcement, 46 J. Legal Educ. 537 (1996)).
98. See Murray, Contracts, supra note 22, at § 50.
99. See id. at § 97[A].
100. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (the general obligation of good faith applicable to all
parties), and U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(b), which applies to merchants and requires not only
"honesty in fact" but "the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade." See also Speidel, supra note 97.
101. There are cowardly appellate judges as well as cautious ones, there
are personal prejudices, there are general prejudices which reach the
level of besotted bigotry, there are the sly as well as the skillful, not
every appellate judge is industrious or steady in attention or careful in
his work, politics and "management" can be found inside the court
and out, there have even been crooks on the appellate bench. And so
what? Taken all together, such things do not materially alter the
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assimilated by courts, it may be distorted or ignored. Courts require
functional analytical structures within their capacities. Judicial
discomfort with broad and unfamiliar norms that depart from vested
understanding invites a resort to formalism, which "spares the lawyer
or judge from a messy encounter with empirical reality."102 The desire
to achieve results that are increasingly fair surrenders to the high
values of certainty, stability and finality. This judicial bias now finds
support in recent scholarship reacting to the new theories.
IV. THE REACTION: NEOFORMALISM
The proclivity of courts to discover rules with sufficient certainty
and predictability is now supported by a "flurry of neoformalism in
contracts scholarship."'0 3  Neoformalists characterize Llewellyn's
realism as antiformalist because obligations are said to be derived not
from the language of the bargain but through an inductive process
resting on "scattered empirical observations."1 4  Llewellyn insisted
that the "text" of the bargain should no longer be the sole basis for
discerning obligations. Rather, "dynamic, legally unformulated, fact
patterns of common life" provide an "immanent law" from which the
parties' obligations are derived." 5 Neoformalists, however, insist that
the business norms the U.C.C. directs courts to incorporate as part of
the "agreement" are inefficient."0 6 Even if such norms were efficient,
courts are said to be hopelessly inept in discovering them."7
Moreover, serious questions arise concerning the very existence of
customary norms that can be incorporated into the agreement. 108 The
whole picture: the appellate bench has stood up throughout our
history; taken as an institution entire, I should think it the least
hypocritical of all our law-governmental institutions; in point of
personal responsible conduct in office, it has earned the honor it has
enjoyed; and I can see no sign that it has declined ... either in
character or in that responsible consciousness of office.
Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition 133 (1960). The influence of
Llewellyn on Roger Traynor is traceable to the summer of 1924 when Llewellyn was
Traynor's first year contracts teacher at Berkeley. See Alfred S. Konefsky, Freedom
and Interdependence in Twentieth-Century Contract Law: Traynor and Hand and
Promissory Estoppel, 65 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1169, 1172 n.9 (1997) (citing James McCall,
The Life of Roger Traynor: Reform and the Pursuit of Justice (unpublished
manuscript)).
102. Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 41 (1990).
103. Woodward, supra note 5, at 1004.
104. Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in Commercial Law,
66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 781, 781 (1999).
105. Id. at 782.
106. Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1697, 1724 (1996).
107. See Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical
Judicial Error, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 749 (2000); Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism
in Relational Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 847 (2000).
108. Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765, 1808-11 (1996)
2002]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
proposed solution, therefore, is to restrict judicial speculation by
emphasizing the language of the static record of agreement."°9 Any
further analysis of the context, the particular situation of the parties,
the trade usage, their prior course of dealing or even their course of
performance is in jeopardy as courts should be discouraged from any
inquiry as to whether the parties did or should have understood the
effect of such language under all of the surrounding circumstances.
The "surrounding circumstances" should no longer be considered
because the "plain meaning" of the words will be decisive and the
parol evidence rule should no longer reflect Llewellynesque
leeways.1"0
Do the neoformalists recommend a return to that "primitive stage
of formalism when the precise word was the sovereign talisman, and
every slip was fatal?""' While they seek to distinguish themselves
from the classical formalism of nineteenth century Langdellians and
its "categorical imperative to deduce rules from first principles,""' 2
their claim that "[w]e are all relationists" is not persuasive"' since
their formalist view "asks that the court respect the literal and explicit
terms of the contract.""' 4 For the formalist or neoformalist, the
contract is relegated to its explicit terms."5 They do not regard
express terms as merely some evidence of the contract. Express terms
and only express terms constitute the contract. Their characterization
of U.C.C. provisions, however, provides clear and convincing evidence
of their fundamental misconceptions.
The formalist critique strikes at the soul of the contract law of the
U.C.C. and its emphasis on an anti-technical, antiformalist and
relational identification of the agreement. "Contract" under the Code
is defined in terms of effect: "the total legal obligation which results
from the parties' agreement.""' 6  Formalists would limit the
recognition of evidence of that "total legal obligation" to express
terms. They dispute Code recognition of trade usage, course of
[hereinafter Bernstein, Merchant Law]; see also Bernstein, supra note 68.
109. See Posner, supra note 107.
110. See Scott, supra note 107, at 866.
111. Judge Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, writing for the court in Wood v. Lucy, Lady
Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88,91 (1917).
112. See Scott, supra note 107, at 851 n.11 (citing Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's
Orthodoxy, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1 (1983)).
113. See Speidel, supra note 97, at 845 n.86 (quoting Scott, supra note 107, at 852).
The author provides a reaction to Dean Scott's claim, see supra text accompanying
note 107, "Nonsense." Speidel, supra note 97, at 845 n.86.
114. Scott, supra note 107, at 851 n.12.
115. It seems unnecessary to refer to this school as "neoformalism"
notwithstanding differences between their rationale and the underlying philosophy of
classical formalism. The results are essentially identical. Thus, the terms "formalist"
and "neoformalist" are used interchangeably.
116. SeeU.C.C.§1-201(11).
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dealing and course of performance.117 They suggest that courts are
authorized by the Code to "vary or trump the express terms of a
written contract" by such evidence.118 Trade usage and course of
dealing evidence, however, do not "trump" anything. Evidence of
their existence makes them part of the original contract. They are
terms of the original contract, though they are subservient to express
terms. 1 9  Formalists also misrepresent course of performance
evidence as supplying "additional contractual provisions."'2  In
determining the meaning of express terms, the Code views course of
performance as "the best indication of what that meaning was." '21
Where a course of performance differs from the express terms, it
constitutes a modification or waiver of the express terms because it is
a clear and current manifestation that the parties have changed their
minds. 22 Thus, course of performance evidences a new contract-a
modified contract-that differs from the original contract because one
or more express terms is modified or waived. The new contract-the
contract as modified-is the only contract. It does not "add" terms to
an existing contract. It is a total misconception to suggest that course
of performance allows courts to alter the express terms of the
contract.2 3 The parties have formed a new contract as they are
allowed to do, whether by express terms or by other clear
manifestations of their intentions. It does seem a tad late in the
evolution of contract theory to remind others that contracts can be
formed, modified and rescinded through manifestations other than
117. Id. §§ 1-201(3),1-205,2-208.
118. See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 108, at 1784; see also Ben-Shahar,
supra note 104, at 790 (1999) ("[Iln a long line of cases courts have held that course of
performance can trump conflicting terms in the contract." (emphasis added)).
119. It is unfortunate that U.C.C. § 2-202(a) uses the term "supplemented" when it
expressly recognizes such terms. Comment 2 is helpful in clarifying the concept:
"Such writings are to be read on the assumption that the course of prior dealings
between the parties and the usages of trade were taken for granted when the
document was phrased." Id. at cmt. 2. The hierarchy is found in U.C.C. § 1-205(4):
where it is not reasonable to construe express terms and unexpressed terms as
consistent with each other, express terms control course of dealing and trade usage
while course of dealing will control trade usage. Section 2-208(2) suggests that
express terms also control course of performance, but U.C.C. § 2-208(3) allows course
of performance to prevail as a modification or waiver. Section 2-208(2) should,
therefore, be revised. Where it is unreasonable to construe express terms and course
of performance as consistent with each other, if course of performance is established
under U.C.C. § 2-208(1), it must operate as a modification or waiver of express terms.
Thus, U.C.C. § 2-208(2) should be revised to recognize the superiority of express
terms over trade usage and prior course of dealing, but not course of performance.
120. Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 108, at 1784.
121. U.C.C. § 2-208 cmt. 1.
122. See id. § 2-208(3).
123. Ben-Shahar, supra note 104. "Although it formally states that the express
terms of the agreement control course of performance and course of dealing, [the
Code] allows the opposite to occur." Id. at 789-90. The author cites only § 2-208(2)
and § 1-205(4) for this proposition, conveniently ignoring § 2-208(3) as analyzed supra
note 119.
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words. The deliberate confusion of the formalists, however, is
unabated. Thus, one finds the assertion, "if a past practice is in
conflict with an explicit contractual provision, the past practice will
often be allowed to vary and trump the express terms." '124 The
statement is predicated, however, on course of performance which is
not a "past practice." It is a current practice under an existing
contract that may provide compelling evidence of the parties'
understanding of their express terms or signal their modification or
waiver. 125
Formalists ignore the fact that course of performance is not
arbitrarily or whimsically established. It requires "repeated occasions
for performance."'2 6 It requires knowledge of the nature of the
performance and opportunity to object to it. 7  The course of
performance must be "accepted or acquiesced in without
objection." ' It constitutes a modification of express terms only
where the requirements of another section are met.'29 The current
case law does not skimp on these requirements.3 " Similarly, course of
dealing will only be recognized where the previous conduct of the
parties "is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of
understanding."'' Trade usage requires that any practice or method
having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade must
justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the
transaction in question. "The existence and scope of such a usage
must be proved as facts"'32 showing that a certain usage is "currently
observed by the great majority of decent dealers."' 33  Formalists
ignore such obvious clarifications because they question the very
existence of trade usage or "custom" as contemplated by the Code.'34
Empirical evidence for a return to formalism is based on
explorations of the practices of trade associations like the National
Grain and Feed Association'35 where efforts to codify customs
124. Ben-Shahar, supra note 104, at 787.
125. U.C.C. § 2-208(1).
126. Id. § 2-208(1) & cmt. 4.
127. Id. § 2-208(1).
128. Id.
129. See id. § 2-208(3) (requiring adherence to U.C.C. § 2-209).
130. See James White & Robert Summers, The Uniform Commerical Code 61
(2000).
131. U.C.C. § 1-205(1).
132. Id. § 1-205(2).
133. Id. § 1-205 cmt. 5.
134. Formalists typically fail to distinguish between common law notions of
"custom," which required that a usage of trade be "ancient or immemorial" or
"universal," and the Code concept, which recognizes new and current usages
observed by the great majority of dealers in the trade. See id. § 1-205 cmt. 5.
135. See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 108. The author describes the
NGFA as an association of firms and individuals who are active in cash-markets for
grain and feed. They agree to submit all disputes to arbitration under Association
rules. Failure to submit a dispute to Association arbitration or failure to comply with
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indicated the lack of widespread agreement among merchants as to
the meaning or content of trade terms or practices.'36 The operation
of these private legal systems is said to suggest "that merchants
differentiate between written and unwritten customs and that their
understanding of customary practices is both different from and far
more nuanced than Llewellyn's."' '37 The latter claim is not empirically
verified for merchants who are not subscribers to private trade
association rules. It is an argument based on speculation motivated by
the apotheosis of efficiency. 3' The trade association rules and
procedures are touted as models that rarely mention custom and even
more rarely consider prior course of dealing or course of performance
in their private adjudication of disputes. Yet, it hardly seems
remarkable that an association of dealers who required decades to
codify customs and practices in a closely-knit industry whose members
are provided with symmetric information, whose reputations are
subject to adverse publicity in their official publication, and whose
disputes are adjudicated by experts in their industry ("wisemen"
arbitrators),1 39 would have limited use for trade usage, prior course of
dealing and course of performance in their adjudications. They
allocated enormous time and resources to the codification of their
customs and practices to standardize them.1
41
Following this interesting exploration, an analysis from whole cloth
assumes a totally rational and sophisticated understanding of private
"relational preserving norms" ("RPNs") and "end-game norms"
("EGNs") by merchants who do not enjoy the advantages of a tightly-
knit trade association. 4' Such parties may use an RPN or EGN
depending upon their goals at different points in their contractual
relationship. Fearing that courts may unwittingly convert an RPN
into an EGN by treating the RPN as a modification of the contract via
the Code's course of performance directive, the Code's search for
"immanent business norms" may produce "a number of undesirable
effects. '1 42 The most prominent "undesirable effect" is illustrated by a
its decision will be reported in the widely disseminated Association newsletter and
may result in the non-complying member's suspension or expulsion from the
Association. Id. at 1771-72.
136. Bernstein, supra note 68, at 715.
137. Id. at 716.
138. "[T]he arguments presented here, together with the empirical evidence from
the NGFA arbitration system . . . ." Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 108, at 1821
(emphasis added).
139. These are similar to the "merchant courts" that Llewellyn unsuccessfully
advocated.
140. See Richard A. Epstein, Confusion About Custom: Disentangling Informal
Customs from Standard Contractual Provisions, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 821, 824 (1999).
141. RPNs seek to preserve the relationship through private, cooperative, legally
unenforceable, flexible adjustments. EGNs, however, are employed when a party
decides to view conduct as a breach and contemplates litigation.
142. Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 108, at 1820.
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seller who would be willing to accept late payments on occasion (an
RPN) but would be unwilling to promise to accept late payments
because the buyer may take opportunistic advantage of such an
enforceable commitment. Because a court could find the acceptance
of late payments to be a course of performance that modified the
express terms of the original contract, the seller may be unwilling to
accept a late payment more than once because the seller does not wish
to be subject to the buyer's potential opportunism to which the seller
would employ an EGN. "Thus, the Code's course of performance
provision reduces the likelihood that transactors in ongoing
relationships will flexibly adjust their contractual obligations, even in
situations where it would be desirable for them to do so."'14 3 This is
characterized as the Code's unwitting promotion of the "rigidity
effect."'44
Beyond the lack of any empirical verification that the typical seller
thinks in such sophisticated terms, one might suggest that the fear of
any rare seller who does think this way can be ameliorated through
the insertion of a common antiwaiver clause in the contract. Not so,
say the formalists. They point to what they apparently view as a
startling example of a court waiving an antiwaiver provision under a
course of performance banner. Neoclassicists are not surprised to
discover the authority for this claim. It had to be Westinghouse Credit
Corp. v. Shelton.'45 Shelton bought a mobile home for which he
agreed to pay $22,662.72 in 144 installments due on the twenty-fifth
day of each month.1 46  The seller's rights were assigned to
Westinghouse, to which Shelton made some forty payments from June
1974 through December 1977.147 Only one or two of the forty
payments were timely, while the others were late by one to three
months.141 Westinghouse accepted payments even after Shelton's
checks bounced during this multi-year period. 49  The contract
contained an antiwaiver clause and the district court granted the
Westinghouse motion for summary judgment.5 Apart from the
antiwaiver clause, there was no doubt that Westinghouse waived its
right to timely payment in accepting so many payments so late over so
long a period. The only question was whether under such extreme
circumstances Westinghouse had waived the antiwaiver clause to the
extent of requiring notice to Shelton that the clause would be restored.
There was a vigorous factual dispute as to whether Westinghouse had
143. Id. at 1.809.
144. Ben-Shahar, supra note 104, at 795 (citing Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra
note 108, at 1808).
145. 645 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1981).
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notified Shelton that it was retracting its waiver.'51 Westinghouse
argued that no retraction was necessary since an antiwaiver clause
cannot be waived.152 The court recognized a split of authority over
this issue, but reversed the summary judgment because "Shelton
should have the opportunity to prove.., that Westinghouse's conduct
in toto regarding timeliness was so pervasive that in the eyes of a
reasonable debtor it 'spoke louder than [the] word.""53 Under these
situation-specific circumstances, if Westinghouse was found to have
waived the antiwaiver clause, the factual issue of whether
Westinghouse notified Shelton of its insistence on strict adherence to
the payment term would bear on whether Westinghouse retracted its
waiver, thereby restoring the operative effect of the antiwaiver clause
that the court emphatically recognized as an enforceable clause.
The formalist does not present the circumstances of this case.
Rather, the citation is presented as evidence of a court arbitrarily
ejecting an express term of the contract via course of performance,
thereby failing to treat the precise word as talismanic.5 4 It would be
embarrassing for a formalist to present these facts. A theory of
contract law that would have a court ignore the context in a case like
Shelton has no redeeming virtue.
151. Id. at 871-72.
152. Id. at 872-73.
153. Id. at 874 (citing Van Bibber v. Norris, 404 N.E.2d 1365, 1374 (Ind. Ct. App.
1980)).
154. It is not surprising that formalists reject such a characterization. Thus, Dean
Scott contends, "Formalist interpretation is not an inflexible and wooden application
of arid first principles-the criticism launched so successfully at the early formalists."
Scott, supra note 107, at 874. He suggests that if courts apply a literal interpretation
and avoid their fallacious contextual frolics, then parties can be protected against
exploitation by "[I]ndustry-specific rules." Id. at 874. "[Slocial norms of trust,
reciprocity, and conditional cooperation" are also suggested as a way to deter such
behavior. Id. at 861. Moreover, "[w]ell-developed doctrines of unconscionability are
available" to protect the exploited, and such legislatively mandated boilerplate as
U.C.C. § 2-316(2), which requires certain formalities to disclaim the implied warranty
of merchantability (i.e., conspicuousness and the word "merchantability"), "generates
(over time) standardized invocations for shifting common legal risks." Id. at 874. The
author envisions a society filled with industry-specific rules and model behavior based
on extra-legal norms of trust and reciprocity. If this is an accurate reflection of
society, the need for judicial policing is reduced to the most egregious behavior. The
apparent thesis is that such a society would be produced by a rigid formalism. The
suggestion that "[w]ell-developed doctrines of unconscionability are available" is a
revelation to neoclassicists who worry about the continuous erosion of the
unconscionability doctrine. Id. The requirements of U.C.C. § 2-316(2) certainly have
generated a standardized invocation for shifting common legal risks. Sellers regard
such requirements as a "safe harbor" device to ensure that the disclaimer of the
implied warranty of merchantability will be the standard in lieu of the fundamental
norm of merchantability. Thus, the deviation from the norm has become the norm as
sellers have succeeded in shifting this quintessential risk to buyers, unless, of course,
the buyer has superior bargaining power and will not deal on that basis. Thus, only
the exploitable buyer suffers the detriment of this "legislatively mandated
boilerplate." Id.
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The formalist analysis bristles with similar misrepresentations:
"Even an express 'merger clause,' stating that the writing constitutes
the entire agreement between the parties, may not bar the
introduction of conflicting information through evidence of past
practices. ' 155 The case allegedly supporting this proposition reveals
that a disclaimer of warranty failed to meet the conspicuous
requirement of U.C.C. § 2-316(2), and the court refused to recognize a
boilerplate merger clause to preclude parol evidence of an oral express
warranty. 56  Would formalists really insist on the enforcement of
every inconspicuous, boilerplate, material risk-shifting clause without
any review of the circumstances? In resisting such a rigid formalism,
neither these nor other cited cases support the view that courts are
engaged in some kind of wild speculation based on "scattered
empirical observations."'57  When, however, a formalist resorts to
155. Ben-Shahar, supra note 104, at 790.
156. Seibel v. Layne & Bowler, Inc., 641 P.2d 668, 670-71 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
Courts recognize the difference between pre-printed (form) merger clauses and
"handcrafted" clauses and retreat from providing conclusive effect to such clauses.
See, e.g., Sierra Diesel Injection Serv. v. Burroughs Corp., 874 F.2d 653, 656 (9th Cir.
1989); Eberhardt v. Comerica Bank, 171 B.R. 239, 243 (E.D. Mich. 1994); Zinn v.
Walker, 361 S.E.2d 314 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
157. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 104, at 781; id. at 790-91 (citing cases). In a
footnote, Ben-Shahar merely cites Van Bibber v. Norris, 404 N.E.2d 1365 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1980). Ben-Shahar, supra note 104, at 791 n.42. The facts are not disclosed
because they would lend no support to the assertion. A bank accepted late payments
on a mobile home fifty-seven of fifty-nine times. Van Bibber, 404 N.E.2d at 1370.
Without notice, it foreclosed on its security interest, and the court refused to enforce
a non-waiver clause under these circumstances without notice that the secured party
would no longer be indulgent. Id. at 1373-74. The author disapproves of Nanakuli
Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 794 (9th Cir. 1981), because the
court found that only two acts were sufficient to constitute a course of performance,
ignoring the additional fact that there were only two possible occasions to
demonstrate adherence to a particular mode of performance and the trade usage was
universally recognized in the industry. Ben-Shahar, supra note 104, at 796 n.58.
Instead of wild judicial speculation as charged by formalists, if anything, courts have
been relatively timid in their reactions to Llewellyn's invitation to use contextual
tools, while emphasizing the usual cases suggesting a "liberal" interpretation of the
use of trade usage, course of dealing or course of performance. See Carter Baron
Drilling v. Badger Oil Corp., 581 F. Supp. 592, 596-98 (D. Colo. 1984) (comparing
cases such as Nanakuli and Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th
Cir. 1971) with other cases that have been "less generous" in their willingness to find
"consistency" between express terms and trade usage where the express terms may be
viewed as literally inconsistent). Formalists fail to mention the cases where courts
insist on providing operative effect to the literal terms of the contract. See, e.g.,
Lupien v. Citizens Utilities Co., 159 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 1998); Hazen First State Bank v.
Speight, 888 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1989); Luria Bros. & Co. v. Pielet Bros. Scrap Iron &
Metal, Inc., 600 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1979); All Angles Constr. & Demolition, Inc. v.
Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 539 S.E.2d 831 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); Bodine
Sewer, Inc. v. Eastern Ill. Precast, Inc., 493 N.E.2d 705 (111. Ct. App. 1986). They also
fail to mention cases which recognize the exclusion of implied warranties by course of
performance. E.g., Oregon Bank v. Nautilus Crane & Equip. Corp., 683 P.2d 95 (Or.
Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing U.C.C. § 2-316(3)).
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characterizations such as "course of performance and its ilk,"' 58 the
absence of an objective analysis is not remarkable.
Another formalist strike concerns judicial competency. The most
extreme expression of the formalist view is that judges are "radically
incompetent" to deal with relational norms.
Courts cannot read parties' intentions from context, so they rely on
the forms the parties choose. There is no evidence for the modern
conviction that judges can reliably determine intentions. And
although courts are not as formalistic as they used to be, there is no
reason to believe that this trend is desirable .......
The analysis concludes that courts should be precluded from any
inquiry into contextual and other relational norms. They should leave
these matters to be determined by "social norms of trust, reciprocity,
and conditional cooperation that also regulate relational contracts.
Under the formalist approach, these norms would not be legally
enforceable contract terms... but they nevertheless would be
enforced by social sanctions that would effectively constrain the
parties' incentives to exploit changed circumstances strategically."' 6 °
This assertion, however, contradicts the later empirical view of
contracting behavior with which the relationist would presumably
agree. 6 ' Formalists insist that Llewellyn's "functional" contract law
failed because it is based on an assumption of competent courts and
incompetent parties while the actual empirical condition that is
alleged to prevail reveals competent parties and incompetent courts. 62
Thus, courts operate effectively only "within tightly constrained,
formal modes of analysis.' 1 63 They should be concerned only with
"the form that parties must satisfy in order to convey their desire that
a court intervene if a dispute arises,"'" and their intervention is
necessary only to deter "high-value opportunism," and then only if
certain conditions are met. 65
158. Ben-Shahar, supra note 104, at 796.
159. Posner, supra note 107, at 770.
160. Scott, supra note 107, at 861 (citation omitted).
161. The modified empiricist conviction asserts that relational and other informal
sanctions "do not always produce cooperation or happy situations. Trust can be
misplaced," thus requiring contract as a living institution to be "very much with us."
Macaulay, supra note 19, at 471; see supra notes 68-70.
162. "I assume that courts are radically incompetent when it comes to meeting the
demands that are placed on them by relational contracts." Posner, supra note 107, at
754.
163. Scott, supra note 107, at 876.
164. Posner, supra note 107, at 771. The author suggests, "A historical example is
the seal." Id.
165. "Radically incompetent" courts can perform this role only under the following
conditions: "the promisor... must receive a higher payoff from performing than by
breaching and incurring litigation cost;" "the promisee must ... gain more (future
business) by maintaining a reputation for toughness than by avoiding the cost of
litigation;" "third parties must have at least partial information about who engaged in
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If formalists are correct in their assumption that parties would
prefer to leave all contextual matters to their private, extra-legal
norms, why do parties fail to make that choice? If competent parties
desire to preclude any judicial consideration of trade usage, course of
dealing or other contextual matters, one would expect to discover a
clause in virtually all merchant contracts "carefully negating" this
"immanent law" from their contracts. 166  The dearth of such
exclusionary clauses in the real world is sound empirical evidence that
the entire formalist structure is predicated upon a foundation of sand,
and even the sand is undiscoverable. 167 The notion that it is difficult to
opt out of Code provisions that allow for the current adjudicative
approach is baseless.16 ' There is nothing in the Code or case law to
opportunism if opportunism occurred;" and "the court [must be able to] determine
whether the parties intended to be legally bound with greater-than-zero accuracy." Id.
at 767-68. But see Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner & Richard Zeckhauser, The
Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 91
(2000). The authors state,
There may be a valuable role for moderately aggressive courts in terms of
filling in gaps in contracts under certain circumstances ... This conclusion, to
be sure, depends on our assumption that courts are reasonably competent,
and can sort out the competing accounts offered by parties about why a
contract takes the form that it did. If this assumption is incorrect, courts
should adopt the more passive stance advocated by Scharwtz [enforcing the
contract literally]. But it is not clear whether this assumption is correct or
incorrect.
Id. at 131.
166. Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 2-202 recognizes the freedom of the parties to do so.
"Unless carefully negated [trade usage and prior course of dealing] have become an
element of the meaning of the words used." U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt.2. Moreover, the
general rule of the U.C.C. is that the provisions of the Code may be varied by
agreement. Id. § 1-102(4) & cmt. 3.
167. The dearth of illustrations from the case law does not suggest that a clause
negating trade usage or prior course of dealing is unenforceable. See CS First Boston
Ltd. v. Behar, No. 94 Civ. 7167,1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21036 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 1995),
which upheld such a clause and, incidentally, also upheld a no-oral-modification and a
no-oral-waiver clause. The dearth of illustrations is empirical evidence of the fact that
parties ordinarily do not choose to negate trade usage and prior course of dealing.
168. See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 108, at 1785 (recognizing the power
of parties to exclude Code provisions such as trade usage and course of dealing but
claiming that it is difficult for them to do so with sufficient certainty). The author
suggests no support for this assertion. See id. If formalism prevailed, Dean Scott
insists, then parties may decide to "opt out of formalism (by appropriately clear
contractual language) and choose instead more contextualized forms of
interpretation." Scott, supra note 107, at 875. If formalism prevailed, the notion that
parties could instruct courts that no longer consider context to return to the present
contextual ambience borders on the absurd as contrasted with the present power of
the parties to instruct courts to ignore context. The formalist cannot understand why
an express term, alone, does not operate to negate trade usage, prior course of dealing
or course of performance. In fact, express terms do control trade usage and course of
dealing. U.C.C. §§ 1-205(4), 2-208(2). How express terms could or should control
course of performance that cannot occur until after the terms are expressed, formalists
do not attempt to explain. Section 2-208(3) of the U.C.C. necessarily recognizes that
such course of performance may evidence a modification or waiver of the prior
express terms. Formalists will point to an isolated opinion such as Nanakuli or
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preclude parties from excluding trade usage or course of dealing.
Moreover, a tightly-drafted negotiated merger clause will be enforced
to preclude any prior or contemporaneous evidence. 169  A clause
precluding oral modifications will also be enforced, though the
formalist will raise the possibility that the parties may have evidenced
their intention to waive such a clause and courts would enforce such a
waiver unless the clause had been reinstated before one of the parties
relied."" This is another illustration of the formalist fallacy that
waivers "alter" or "trump" the talismanic word. The parties may, of
course, avoid any judicial intervention by expressly negating any
intention to be legally bound. According to the formalists, the only
risk they would assume is the inability of their otherwise powerful
extra-legal norms to deter "high-value opportunism. '"171 It is no
answer to raise the bar of transaction costs to effectuate any or all of
these results since such costs would be modest. Notwithstanding the
availability of these obvious devices, the formalist would recommend
legislatively mandated certainty:
[T]he Code should be amended to include a 'safe harbor' provision
that would give merchant-transactors a simple and reliable way to
either opt out of the Code's adjudicative approach or selectively opt
out of its usage of trade, course of performance, or course of dealing
provisions. Such a safe harbor would enable merchant-transactors to
select their preferred degree of contextualized adjudication and
would transform the Code's quasi-mandatory interpretive approach
into a default approach that merchant-transactors could avoid when
they found it advantageous to do SO. 17 2
"[L]egislatively mandated boilerplate" 173 allegedly minimizes the
burden placed upon allegedly incompetent courts. Like the historic
seal, "'74 legislatively approved language would allow for robotic
determinations of the enforceability of a clause. Courts would be
required to jettison interpretation or construction as well as
background or context and simply enforce or refuse to enforce a
clause based exclusively upon adherence to the talismanic word. The
entire Code could be filled with "safe harbors" that would ensure
Shelton without elaboration of the particular facts, to allege that courts have not
followed U.C.C. directives.
169. Absent such circumstances as fraud, unconscionability or mistake, a clause
that expressly states that the writing is the final, complete and exclusive statement of
the parties' intention will be given conclusive effect. See Childers Oil Co., v. Exxon
Corp., 960 F.2d 1265, 1270 (4th Cir. 1992); see also Telecom Int'l Am. Ltd. v. AT&T
Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 189, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (giving an "unequivocal integration"
clause conclusive effect).
170. See U.C.C. § 2-209(5) (allowing the reinstatement of a waived term prior to
reliance by the party against whom such a term would operate).
171. Posner, supra note 107, at 762.
172. Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 108, at 1821.
173. Scott, supra note 107, at 874.
174. See supra note 164.
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against the current adjudicative approach, thereby assuring the demise
of the informal contract as we know it. Beyond the obvious "safe
harbors" in the current Code, there are additional Code provisions
that have been construed as legislatively mandated safe harbors with
less than desirable effects. It is appropriate to consider a conspicuous
example.
The most controversial section of Article 2 of the Code is the
infamous "battle of the forms" section, section 2-207, which will not
be rehashed since it has been subject to extensive, and sometimes
superfluous, scholarly analysis.175  It is important, however, to
remember that, like other Llewellyn pronouncements, it was
presented essentially as a principle rather than a set of rules:176 "(2)
The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to
the contract and between merchants become part of the contract
unless they materially alter it or notification of objection to them has
already been given with a reasonable time. 177 When New York Law
Revision Commission Executive Director John W. MacDonald
queried Llewellyn about U.C.C. § 2-207 in 1954, the 1952 draft of that
section before the Commission contained the extant subsection (1)
without the last proviso, "unless acceptance is expressly made
conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. '178  A
comment, however, stated, "unless the acceptance is made conditional
on the acceptance of the additional terms," i.e., it did not say,
"expressly made conditional."' 7 9 MacDonald sought an explication of
the comment language since he could find nothing in the section
language manifesting this qualification." Llewellyn explained that
the comment referred to
the first line of subsection (1), i.e., "A definite and seasonable
expression of acceptance. .. the word 'acceptance' in the first line of
subsection (1). We don't see how that can be an expression of
acceptance which says, 'This is not an acceptance unless you take the
terms that we put here in addition." ' 181
175. For a current analysis, see Murray, Contracts, supra note 22, § 49.
176. The 1952 version presented to the New York Law Revision Commission read
as follows:
§ 2-207. Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation.
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an
acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those
offered or agreed upon.
Hearings, supra note 46, at 33.
177. Id.
178. U.C.C. § 2-207(1).
179. Id. § 2-207(1) cmt. 2.
180. Hearings, supra note 46, at 116.
181. Id. at 117. One of the fundamental flaws in the analyses of U.C.C. § 2-207 for
nearly a half century has been the failure to emphasize and elaborate the fundamental
and critical requirement of a "definite expression of acceptance," notwithstanding
[Vol. 71
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While Llewellyn saw no need to include the comment language in
the section, MacDonald indicated concern over different
constructions of section and comment language. This induced an
impatient response from Llewellyn, who recognized the power of the
Commission to include such comment language in the section but
emphatically cautioned against such a change: "But, for the love of
heaven, Mr. MacDonald, go slow on the drafting-go slow on the
drafting!'182
Llewellyn's caution was ignored as evidenced by the current U.C.C.
§ 2-207 that includes the former comment language, tacked on to
U.C.C. § 2-207(1). 183 The incredible judicial construction of the
section ensued.
Accepting the iconoclastic mandate that U.C.C. § 2-207 "rejected"
the classic "mirror image rule" to the extent that a response to an
offer containing variant, undickered terms would constitute an
"acceptance" rather than a counter offer,184 courts had to decide what
language in a response would constitute a counter offer. While a clear
statement that the response is a "counter offer" would be recognized,
sellers are reluctant to make such statements for fear of losing a
sale. 85  The typical boilerplate in acknowledgment forms was
surreptitious, e.g., "'The acceptance of your order is subject to the
terms and conditions on the face and reverse side hereof ....
When such language was deemed insufficiently clear to constitute a
U.C.C. § 2-207 counter offer,187 it required little imagination to draft a
"safe harbor" counter offer pursuant to the MacDonald amended
version of U.C.C. § 2-207(1): "'Seller's acceptance is ... expressly
conditioned on Buyer's assent to the additional or different terms and
different or additional terms. As evidenced by Mr. MacDonald's concerns, the
concept of an acceptance containing variant terms was especially difficult to
assimilate. Llewellyn, of course, viewed it as perfectly obvious. If a response to an
offer appears to a reasonable offeror to be an acceptance, it should operate as an
acceptance, notwithstanding variant terms. If, however, the response clearly states
that the offeree will agree only if its terms are part of the contract, i.e., the response
conditions acceptance on the terms of the response, it is clearly not a definite
expression of acceptance and must be a counter offer. Llewellyn believed that a mere
reminder of this obvious construction in a comment would be quite sufficient.
182. Id. at 182.
183. See 1 State of New York Law Revision Commission Report: Study of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 390-94 (1955).
184. The classical "mirror image" rule was not "rejected." Even courts using that
language would recognize that an offer to sell 1000 widgets at $10 per widget would
not be accepted by a response agreeing to take 500 widgets or 1000 smidgets or 1000
widgets at $8 per widget. Such a response would not be a "definite and seasonable
expression of acceptance" as required under U.C.C. § 2-207(l). When, therefore,
there is a difference in "dickered" terms, the "mirror image" rule lives.
185. My empirical verification for this statement is based upon numerous
discussions with sellers and their lawyers who confess, "It would never get by the
marketing department."
186. Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1164 (6th Cir. 1972).
187. Id. at 1164-65.
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conditions set forth below and printed on the reverse side."""8
Characterizing such a response tracking the statutory language as a
counter offer rejected both the sensible doctrine that an offeror
should not be placed in the position of attempting to decipher an
equivocal response and the attendant guide that the effect of any
response to an offer must be determined according to the reasonable
understanding of the offeror-neither of which Llewellyn had any
intention of changing. Nonetheless, courts insisted that such an
"ambiguous" formula response had to be a counter offer whenever an
offeree used the statutory "safe harbor" language." 9  Having
performed its duty of fidelity to a legislatively mandated "safe
harbor," practical legal reasoning raised the specter of fairness and
purposive interpretation requiring courts to cure the effects of rigid
adherence to this standard. A reasonable offeror would not
understand an ambiguous response as a counter offer with the
attendant effect of subjecting the offeror who accepted the goods to
the "last shot" terms of the offeree, thereby emasculating the entire
purpose of U.C.C. § 2-207. To remedy the effects of the formal "safe
harbor," they issued a judicial ukase rejecting another rule that
Llewellyn had no intention of changing, the common-law rule that
acceptance of goods in response to a "true" counter offer is an
acceptance of the terms of the counter offer. While it would be
oppressive to hold the offeror to the terms of an ambiguous counter
offer, the very notion of an "ambiguous counter offer" is an
oxymoron. Compelled to call such a response a counter offer, the
judicial cure was to demand that only an "express" acceptance of the
terms of such an "ambiguous counter offer" would allow the offeree's
different or additional terms to become part of the contract (a "covert
tool"). 9" Unconscious application of this "precedent," however, has
been extended to perfectly clear and understandable counter offers
which are not accepted by the acceptance of the goods. The
prevailing case law now insists on express language of assent to a
188. S. Itoh & Co. v. Jordan Int'l Co., 552 F.2d 1228, 1232 (7th Cir. 1977). The
"safe harbor" is ineffective unless it sufficiently tracks the language of the last proviso
of § 2-207(1). See Dorton, 453 F.2d 1161.
189. Itoh, 552 F.2d at 1238 ("[T]he seller injected ambiguity into the transaction by
inserting the 'expressly conditional' clause...").
190. Id. A party making a formula counter offer is bound to no contract and may
"walk away" from the transaction unless the original offeror has expressly assented to
the terms of the counter offer. If an offeree-seller merely ships the goods and the
offeror-buyer accepts the goods, the terms of the contract are governed by U.C.C. § 2-
207(3), incorporating the matching terms of the exchanged forms that otherwise did
not form a contract, and eliminating non-matching terms leaving gaps to be filled by
the "supplementary" terms of U.C.C. Article 2. Not surprisingly, there is no recorded
instance of a buyer expressly accepting the seller's counter offer terms since the buyer
(and the seller) typically assume that a contract had been formed by the exchange of
forms.
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counter offer of pristine clarity.191 To overcome the unfairness of the
"safe harbor," the judicial remedy seemed desirable but was
unconsciously converted into another formality. The unwitting
triumph of formalism was complete. If Mr. MacDonald had followed
Llewellyn's advice to "go slow on the drafting," it is at least possible
that courts would have been forced to pursue the kind of analysis that
formalists reject and this tortured history may have been avoided.'92
A recent illustration of a formalist victory attributable to
instrumentalist efficiency is found in cases affording blanket operative
effect to standardized terms, without opportunity to review them
before the contract appears to have been made, and with the express
recognition that silence will constitute acceptance of such terms. In a
swashbuckling tour de force that dangerously misinterprets legislation
and precedent, 93 the court created a new concept of "rolling" or
"layered" contract formation where the contract is not made when the
parties thought it was made, but only after a buyer will be said to have
191. See, e.g., Ralph Shrader, Inc. v. Diamond Int'l Corp., 833 F.2d 1210, 1215 (6th
Cir. 1987), where the court said that a response to an offer could be "no clearer in
conditioning acceptance than it was in stating, 'The terms set forth on the reverse side
are the only ones upon which we will accept orders: These terms superseded all prior
written understandings, assurances and offers."' Id. Yet, only an express assent by the
offeror rather than merely accepting the goods will be necessary to accept such a clear
counter offer. For an interesting though failing effort to convince a court that the
formula language is ambiguous and should not be viewed as a counter offer, see PCS
Nitrogen Fertilizer, L.P. v. Christy Refractories, L.L.C., 225 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. 2000).
See also White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. McGill Mfg. Co., 165 F.3d 1185 (8th Cir. 1999).
192. Unfortunately, this is not the only U.C.C. § 2-207 pathology that is
attributable to a formalist interpretation of the statute. For an illustration of the
difficulty created by a strict interpretation of U.C.C. § 2-207(2) that expressly includes
only "additional" but not "different" terms, see Northrop Corp. v. Litronic Industries,
29 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1994), where the opinion by Judge Posner indicates a
preference for a workable interpretation but surrenders to the probability that Illinois
courts would follow the literal prevailing view. See Murray, Contracts, supra note 22,
§ 50[E].
193. The two leading cases are ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir.
1996), and Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997), where Judge
Easterbrook wrote both opinions for the court. Insisting that the holding is based on
the common law of contracts and contract formation sections of the U.C.C., the
opinions ignore references to numerous cases that refused to enforce post-formation
limitations of buyers' rights. In attempting to distinguish Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc.
v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991), a case denying enforceability to such
post-formation terms, ProCD suggests that U.C.C. § 2-207 applies only to merchants,
a clear misinterpretation of the language of U.C.C. § 2-207(2) and interpretations
thereof. See ProCd, 86 F.3d at 1452. Many cases recognize that the first sentence of
U.C.C. § 2-207(2), which treats additional terms as "proposals," must apply only to a
contract involving a non-merchant since the second sentence and the subsections that
follow apply to contracts "between merchants." Even more troublesome is the
superficial notion that U.C.C. § 2-207 applies only where there are two conflicting
forms, which ignores the U.C.C.'s application where a single confirmation containing
variant terms follows an oral contract for the sale of goods to which U.C.C. § 2-207
clearly applies. See Dorton, 453 F.2d 1161. For a comprehensive analysis see Murray,
Contracts, supra note 22, § 50(I).
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accepted by silence the seller's post-purchase terms "inside the box,"
thereby assuring an "efficient" result.194 There is, however, no escape
from the necessary determination of whether the standardized terms
to which a party will be said to have assented are fair and this
standard cannot be applied mechanically.'95 Ironically, this "rolling"
or "layered" contract theory may be viewed as "relational" though the
true relationist would reject any such characterization as heretical.
Meanwhile, the American Law Institute ("ALI") approved a revised
version of U.C.C. Article 2 only to have it summarily dismissed by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
("NCCUSL"). 196 A new committee created "proposed amendments"
rather than a revised Article 2 that expressly avoid criticism of the
"rolling" contract decisions since it might alarm the strong sellers who
dominate the approval process. 97  Simultaneously a legislative
194. The terms are not revealed until the buyer opens the box or uses a computer
disk and sees the terms flash on the screen. The court justifies the enforceability of
"inside the box" terms on the footing that printing the terms on the outside of the box
is cumbersome. With respect to telephone sales, the court presents the absurd
scenario of a seller's operator reading contract terms to the prospective buyer. In
ProCD, there was a fine print statement relating to terms inside the software
container. ProCd, 86 F.3d at 1450. In Hill v. Gateway, there was no mention of terms
during the telephone order or on the container. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150. A conspicuous
notice on the outside of a box stating that the purchase is conditioned on acceptance
of terms inside the box does not appear cumbersome. Nor would it be cumbersome
for a telephone operator in a "1-800" sale to mention that the buyer will be bound to
terms inside the container. There is some anecdotal evidence that this practice has
begun.
195. See Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (App. Div. 1998) where,
after the purchase, a copy of Gateway's "standard terms and conditions" arrived with
the container stating, "By keeping your Gateway 2000 computer system beyond thirty
(30) days after the date of delivery, you accept these Terms and Conditions." Id. at
570. The document contained sixteen paragraphs. Paragraph 10 was a "dispute
resolution" provision subjecting the parties to the rules of the International Chamber
of Commerce (located in France) with the arbitration to be held in Chicago. A claim
of less than $50,000 required an advance arbitration fee of $4000, a sum greater than
the cost of most Gateway products, and $2000 of this fee was nonrefundable. The
court adopted the ProCD/Hill analysis holding that the contract was not formed when
the buyer purchased the computer but only with the retention of the computer
beyond the thirty days specified in the terms and conditions. The court, however,
recognized the obvious substantive unconscionability of an oppressive arbitration
process but confronted the obstacle that precedent required both procedural and
substantive unconscionability before concluding that substantive unconscionability,
alone, could make the clause inoperative. Id. at 569.
196. For a candid view of this "debacle," see Richard E. Speidel, Revising U.C.C
Article 2: A View From the Trenches, 52 Hastings L.J. 607 (2001).
197. The Proposed Amendments to Uniform Commercial Code Article 2-Sales
(2002) were approved at the 2002 NCCUSL meeting. The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 2002 Annual Meeting Draft, available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc.htm. The "battle of the forms" section has
undergone substantial revision that seeks to avoid the maladies of its predecessor by
eliminating issues of contract formation which are left to other sections, recognizing
terms only if they appear in the "records" of both parties or by other express
agreement, eliminating any distinction between different or additional terms or
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NCCUSL miscreant sanctioned the "layered contract" analysis and
other extant practices of a specific industry in an abominable
"uniform law" that guarantees non-uniformity while lending support
to the CLS hymn that everything is politics and power.198 These and
other examples of formalism can only be resisted by a rejuvenated
effort to promote a theory of contract law within a realistic
adjudication context.
V. PRACTICAL LEGAL REASONING
The quintessential error of the theorists is their unwillingness to
accept the reality of practical reasoning. They have created "a
distinctive and abstract discipline of their own that seems largely
disconnected from the ways in which real lawyers and judges act."'199
They necessarily "look down on the discourse of legal practice with a
mixture of incomprehension and disdain."2 ' They yearn for a more
scientific and instrumentalist approach that would dictate certain
conceptions of law and social policy. An instrumentalist formalism
with the singular goal of free-market efficiency competes with the
equally instrumentalist social science visions that would require
material or immaterial terms, and generally allowing courts greater discretion to
determine which terms shall be operative. The Statute of Frauds (U.C.C. § 2-201) has
been modified to raise the threshold to $5000, clarify the "admissions" exception by
expressly allowing admissions made in depositions and, like its counterpart in § 8-113
(Investment Securities), eliminate the one-year provision of the Statute of Frauds.
Two new sections, U.C.C. §§ 2-313A and 2-313B, provide guidance in recognizing
express warranties for remote purchasers and protection for "remedial promises" that
often attend warranties. Three new sections, U.C.C. §§ 2-211 through 2-213,
recognize electronic contracts, consistent with the Uniform Electronic Transactions
Act ("UETA"). A warranty disclaimer effected by "as is" or "with all faults" must be
conspicuous in a consumer transaction and statutorily prescribed language is required
as an alternative disclaimer in such contracts. A new right is created for consumers to
recover identified goods after making a down payment. The troublesome notice
requirement of U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) is modified to bar a buyer's remedy only if the
failure of such notice was prejudicial to the seller. The seller's right to cure is clarified
and made available after revocation of acceptance in merchant but not consumer
contracts. A buyer's reasonable use of goods after rejection or revocation of
acceptance is not wrongful. Courts are encouraged to enforce contractual provisions
allowing specific performance (U.C.C. § 2-716(1)) and the restitutionary rights of
prepaying buyers (U.C.C. § 2-718(1)) are clarified. The statute of limitations (U.C.C.
§ 2-725) is clarified and extended to allow an action to be brought within four years of
accrual or one year after the breach should have been discovered by no more than
five years after accrual. Amended U.C.C. § 2-710 allows a seller to recover
consequential damages, but not from a consumer buyer. There are new definitions
and language changes including the pervasive effort to achieve gender-neutral
language.
198. UCITA has been adopted with hesitation and qualification in two states,
Virginia and Maryland, and confronted opposition in other states. See Brian D.
McDonald, The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 16 Berkeley Tech.
L.J. 461, 461 (2001).
199. Steven D. Smith, Believing Like A Lawyer, 40 B.C. L. Rev. 1041, 1092 (1999).
200. Id.
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comprehensive state regulation to pursue certain societal results.
Theorists seek to impose their idiosyncratic views on a process that is
necessarily eclectic and administered by heterogeneous decision-
makers who are largely committed to an unscientific and untheoretical
methodology often called practical legal reasoning."
"[L]egal reasoning does not function according to a purely
deductive model. Rather, it functions more like a coherence theory or
as a theory of practical reasoning from ends to appropriate means."2"2
Judge Richard Posner recognizes that a logical positivist would deny
that any proposition that is neither analytic nor verifiable can have
any truth value, but he disagrees: "'[P]ractical reason'-a grab bag of
reasoning methods that includes deliberation, interpretation, reliance
on authority, tacit knowledge, and much else besides-can be used to
establish the truth of many propositions with a reasonable (sometimes
a very high degree) of certainty."2"3
Practical legal reasoning incorporates logic but is not controlled by
the syllogism that requires complete faith in the premises. It
recognizes the importance of "principle" but rejects the
foundationalist view that norms can be deduced from a single unifying
principle. Similarly, it respects "rules" but rejects the formalist view
that the "correct" result can simply be deduced from the rules.0 4
Practical reasoning judges pay deference to precedent as authorities
and analogies but they know that they are not compelled to decide
exclusively by precedent except in rare situations."5 Stare decisis is
not the exclusive value. When confronted with the interpretation of a
contract or statute, judges are not pure textualists because they cannot
avoid entirely the kind of purposive interpretation that obsessed
Llewellyn.2"6 While there are still too many examples of an insecure
201. For discussions of "practical reasoning," see Smith, supra note 199. See also
Steven J. Burton, Law As Practical Reason, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 747 (1989); Daniel A.
Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism and the Rule of Law,
45 Vand. L. Rev. 533 (1992); Linda Ross Meyer, Is Practical Reason Mindless? 86
Geo. L.J. 647 (1998); Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 Mich. L.
Rev. 827 (1988).
202. Stick, supra note 23, at 350.
203. Posner, supra note 201, at 890-91.
204. See Farber, supra note 201, at 539.
205. See Posner, supra note 201, at 845.
206. U.C.C. § 1-102(1) ("This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to
promote its underlying purposes and policies."); U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1 ("The text of
each section should be read in the light of the purpose and policy of the rule or
principle in question, as also of the Act as a whole, and the application of the
language should be construed narrowly or broadly, as the case may be, in conformity
with the purposes and policies involved."); see Julian B. McDonnell, Purposive
Interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Implications for Jurisprudence,
126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 795 (1978). But see Gregory E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn's Fading
Imprint on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 71 U. Colo. L. Rev.
541, 564-72 (2000) (suggesting some evidence of a retreat from Llewellyn's purposive
direction to a more textualist judicial perspective).
[Vol. 71
CONTRACTS AND NEOFORMALISM
judge manifesting a "plain meaning" bent, it has become infinitely
more difficult to avoid the truth, as suggested in Corbin's crushing
insight:
It is sometimes said, in a case in which the written words seem plain
and clear and unambiguous, that the words are not subject to
interpretation or construction. One who makes this statement has of
necessity already given the words an interpretation-the one that is
to him plain and clear; and in making the statement he is asserting
that any different interpretation is "perverted" and untrue.207
Judges using practical reason know that their engagement with the
"surrounding circumstances" does not rise to the level of systematic
empirical inquiry because the parties have neither the time nor
resources to provide it, and even with sufficient time and resources,
complete data would be undiscoverable. 20 8 The formalist notion that
judges should not be permitted to consider necessarily incomplete
empirical observations, however, suggests a monistic and dangerous
approach. While practical legal reasoning includes judicial intuition
that guards against outrageous results, Llewellyn did not advocate ad
hoc judicial decision making and neither do contemporary judges.
While emphatically refusing to "sanctify" judges, 2 9 he not only
demonstrated his understanding of the judicial process but his respect
for it.
"Safe harbors," standardized terms and other formalistic devices
create an illusion of certainty that can foster manifest injustice. The
formalist "implicit assumption that courts function well when they
operate within tightly constrained, formal modes of analysis ''2 ° is
unwarranted. A critical and pervasive feature of the judicial process is
totally ignored by the formalist-the compulsion to administer justice
between the parties before the court within recognizable legal
standards. 21  Practical legal reasoning may be described as a rough
sense of justice that does not admit of precise empirical verification.
It is, however, a reality promoting an underlying value that
continuously competes with the values of certainty and predictability.
No matter how clear the language of a standardized term created by a
lawyer drafting "to the absolute limit of what the law can conceivably
207. Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50
Cornell L.Q. 161, 171-72 (1965). See the opinion by Justice Roger Traynor in Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968).
See also Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1980).
208. See Posner, supra note 201, at 836.
209. See Llewellyn, supra note 101.
210. Scott, supra note 107, at 875-76.
211. "[I]f these modern jurisprudes are forgetting that the goal of law is justice, and
forgetting also that judges and other officials must not be free to be arbitrary, then
they need correction at once and, if need be, with a club." Karl N. Llewellyn,
Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice 152 (1962).
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bear," '2 12 and no matter how carefully the drafted clause tracks a safe
harbor, "[w]hen it gets too stiff to make sense, then the court may
knock it over." '213 To avoid unfair surprise and oppression under
formal constraints, courts would again resort to "covert tools" that
promote unnecessary confusion and unpredictability. It is not enough
to characterize the prescriptions of the formalists as unrealistic and
misguided. Because of the proclivity of courts to favor certainty and
predictability, unlike the other theories, formalism constitutes a clear
and present danger in contract theory.
Current theorists are not satisfied with the fact that "the judge is
trying to reach the most reasonable results in the circumstances
(which include but are not limited to the facts of the case and to legal
doctrines)."'214 Such a theory does not augur the kind of analysis that a
dilettante would find inviting. No legal scholar should have to be
reminded of the Aristotelian truth that one should not expect as much
certainty from law as one expects from physics. There are opinions
that are beautiful, such as those pedagogical efforts that "let us 'see'
the law in a way that 'fits,"' opinions that "ring true" and "look
right."2 5 They penetrate a maze of pedestrian precedent to unearth a
principle that allows the development of doctrine." 6 There are ugly
opinions, most of which reek of excessive formalism, and the
remainder fall somewhere on the spectrum. Those that escape the
212. Hearings, supra note 46, at 113 (statement of Karl Llewellyn). For an
elaboration of this thought, see Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in
Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1173, 1205 (1983).
213. Hearings, supra note 46, at 114 (statement of Karl Llewellyn).
214. Posner, supra note 201, at 862.
215. See Meyer, supra note 201, at 666.
216. Obvious illustrations in contract law are the products of Judge Benjamin
Nathan Cardozo during his tenure on the New York Court of Appeals. Karl
Llewellyn characterized such judging in the grand tradition in his description of
Cardozo's opinion in the classic case of McPherson v. Buick:
See what he did. It is so simple. It is so grand .... [H]e set up a significant
type-situation: consumer-purchase in a community which has to rely on
increasingly un-understandable basic technology. That typical situation,
seen that way, stepped up the aspect of reliance and stepped down the
aspect of fault .... What the opinion does is to feel that picture. Indeed, it is
not the job of a great judge to get fully explicit, all at once, about great social
change. His job is to feel what he can, and to see what he can, and to say
what he can. But his method has to be reach, first, for the significant type-
situation. Then, to diagnose a problem, and to prescribe an answer
accompanied by an explicit life-reason: this not only helps toward a good
answer, but it is also priceless in affording easy wherewithal for tomorrow's
intelligent application, or else for tomorrow's explicit correction, whichever
tomorrow's case may prove to need.
Llewellyn, supra note 211, at 223; see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, Cardozo and
Posner. A Study in Contracts, 36 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1379, 1381 (1.995) (stating that
Cardozo "was at once master of the incremental evolution of the common law and
servant of the imperative to adapt law to the needs of those it governs, evincing in his
contracts opinions a fluid sense of doctrine and an animating principle of justice
broadly conceived").
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"ugly" may be called "pedestrian" or "workmanlike" while those that
approach the "beautiful" are "sound." The fact that judges and
scholars can weigh their intrinsic value evidences the unique character
of the practical legal reasoning process.217 Practical legal reasoning is
an empirically verified fact that Llewellyn clearly understood and for
which he had complete empathy. Modern theorists, however, are
unwilling to accept the fact of such an imperfect process.218 All of
their protestations about the indeterminateness and unrealistic nature
of doctrine ignore this empirically verified process. They also ignore
the incontestable fact that, with all of its imperfections and limitations,
the process works. The aspiration for absolutely "correct" results
surrenders to the reality that the actual results are more often than
not as correct as any imperfect adjudicative institution can make them
and, on occasion, their "correctness" is profound. There are always
new opinions that approach the "beautiful" and some will eventually
be recognized as "landmark." '219 Llewellyn's "new" contract law, now
a half century old, had a dramatic effect on the refinement of doctrine.
The difficulty experienced in the historic, decade-long failure to
produce a revised Article 2 of the U.C.C. but to settle for some
amendments that, with rare exception, are obvious, is not due
exclusively to partisan views. It is also a tribute to the genius of
Llewellyn.
CONCLUSION
Euphemistic neoclassicist reactions to the new theories are
misunderstood and ineffective.2 0 The product of the CLS scholars,
217. While recognizing this process, Judge Posner would not agree that there is
anything unique about it. He sees nothing special about practical reasoning used by
judges as contrasted with the practical reasoning of everyday life. See Posner, supra
note 201. Not everyone, however, thinks about everyday life as does Judge Posner. It
may not be special for him, but it is special for the rest of us. In a review of his latest
book (at least, at the time of this writing), Public Intellectuals: A Study in Decline,
David Brooks suggests that Posner "publishes a new book more or less after every
meal." David Brooks, Notes From a Hanging Judge, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 2002, § 7, at
9.
218. While economic theory can provide valuable insights, by now, even Judge
Posner must be convinced that it will never dominate the legal process. His proclivity,
however, continues. In the review of his latest book, David Brooks laments Posner's
economic analysis of intellectual output. "And so watching Posner try to apply
economic laws to public debate is a bit like watching a Martian trying to use statistics
to explain a senior prom .... [H]e's missing the fraught complexity of the thing."
Brooks, supra note 217, at 9.
219. In the preparation of the fifth edition of my cases and materials on contracts
(2000), 1 was particularly taken with the vitality of the process that has recently
produced a large number of excellent "pedagogical" opinions (including those of
Judge Posner) that manifest a clear understanding of the history of doctrine, its
development in recent years and its refinement and extension to modern issues.
220. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, The Richness of Contract Law: An Analysis and
Critique of Contemporary Theories of Contract Law (1997). In reflecting on the
presentations on the teaching of Contract law at an AALS Conference, Professor
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relationists and empiricists as currently presented may continue to be
regarded as nothing more than sounding brass and tinkling cymbals.
A considerable portion of law and economics scholarship may share a
similar fate. In the words of a prominent judge, "I say to myself, there
just has be something here for all the rest of us. I just can't seem to
find it." '221 The deliberate failure to suggest practical reasoning that
would assist courts in a continuous progression of extended and
refined analyses of contract doctrine suggests an abdication of
responsibility. In creating products that are useless to courts and
practitioners while promoting their scorn, they unwittingly invite a
reactionary formalism in contract theory. The desideratum of
discovering wisdom from other disciplines is frustrated when the
expertise of its presenters is questionable and its product is often
delivered in a form that is not only obtuse but destructively critical
and philotyrranical in its demand that the current system lacks any
redeeming virtue.222 Moreover, the inability to suggest meaningful
substitutes is not simply a theoretical mistake, it is a moral failing.223
Formalists are eager to fill this void. They would create a world of
"plain meaning" interpretation, ridding the adjudication of contract
disputes of any evidence unexpressed in words, reinstating a
draconian parol evidence rule, and even precluding the parties
themselves from modifying their contract or waiving one or more
terms in any fashion other than express terms. Contracts would be
filled with legislatively mandated "safe harbors" that would insure the
enforceability of terms dictated by parties with superior bargaining
power. Enforceability would be determined exclusively by adherence
to formula words to promote some model of efficiency that allegedly
omniscient decision makers decided rational parties ought to pursue,
regardless of other manifestations of intention. Any danger in the
approaches of other theories pales by comparison to the clear and
present danger of a return to formalism in its new bottle. While it
Grant Gilmore stated,
[Olne thing that has saddened me has been the truly extraordinary kindness
and courtesy that the panelists have shown to each other. When A finished
his remarks, B would arise and say, "I agree with every word that my
learned brother and dear friend has said. No one could improve on his
presentation..." Now what I would like to see is that B, when A has
finished his piece, would get up and turn to his opponent and say, "You, sir,
are a scoundrel, and what is more, you are a lily-livered paltroon, a disgrace
to the noble profession of teaching Contracts." At that point, things might
begin to get interesting.
Gilmore, quoted in Kelso, supra note 18, at 639-40.
221. With respect to CLS, Judge Judith Kaye states: "The movement has scholarly
books, scholarly articles, annual conferences and a seemingly glowing following in
academic circles. These facts give me real pause. I say to myself, there just has to be
something here for all the rest of us. I just can't seem to find it." Kaye, supra note 31,
at 266.
222. See Gordon, supra note 2.
223. See Nozick, supra note 30.
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may be no more difficult intellectually to dismiss this extremist
position as it is to dismiss extremist CLS theory, the brooding
omnipresence of formalism cannot be ignored.224 Even its remnants
can have a corrosive effect on the effort to pursue a continuous
expansion and refinement of contract doctrine.
Neoclassicists do not deny the imperfections of the current system
and judicial vision. Nor do they deny the potential contributions of
the relationists, empiricists and economists. The insuperable obstacles
are their insistence that they have discovered unitary truth, their
corresponding rejection of on-going neoclassical theory that prevails
in the real world, and their failure to provide even hints of functional
substitutes in an ambience of practical judicial reasoning. Indeed,
neoclassical theory is in the forefront of the war against formalism,
but unlike the others, neoclassicists believe the war must be won, and
more articles about meta-theory that despair over the inadequacies of
current theory will not win it. Llewellyn's aspiration of a more decent,
conscionable, good faith contracts society is necessarily a work in
progress. In a world where courts can decide whether a breach is
material or immaterial, whether performance is substantial or
insubstantial, whether conduct is reasonable or unreasonable, and
whether injustice can only be avoided by the enforcement of a
promise, it is not enough to reject a mandate such as
unconscionability, good faith or other Llewellynesque standards or
"leeways" as fatally vague. As judges traverse these gray areas, the
academic bar has a distinct obligation to assist the process-"if not
turning the grays into black and white, at least making the shade of
gray more discernible. '225 Whatever deficiencies lie in the vagaries of
Llewellyn's efforts, there can be no reasonable doubt about his
underlying purpose. Neoclassicists feel obliged to pursue a realistic
scholarly dimension that will assist courts in the fulfillment of that
purpose.
224. There is evidence of a return to formalism in the case law. See Ralph James
Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 Or. L. Rev. 1131 (1995). There
is also evidence of a developing textualist approach that would ignore the implied
duties of good faith and fair dealing in relation to express terms. See Michael P. Van
Alstine, Textualism, Party Autonomy and Good Faith, 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1223
(1999).
225. Ripple, supra note 81, at 431. It is interesting to note that while the new
theories produced virtually no case law citations over the last thirty years, what may
be the most famous law review article in American legal history consisting of twenty-
eight pages and limited footnotes published in 1890 was cited more than two hundred
times and over 900 times in the law reviews during the same period. Samuel Warren
& Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
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